

School—and elected to the New Jersey State Senate from our Passaic County district in 1967 and concurrently continued to serve out his term as mayor of Wayne to which he had been elected in 1964. He was named delegate to the State Constitutional Convention in 1966 and was nearing the end of his initial term as State senator at the time of his demise.

A staunch Republican, Senator Sisco joined the Wayne organization in 1958 and was party leader before being elected Wayne's Sixth Ward Councilman in 1962. He also became the first council president that year under a new form of government, and served two terms.

A member of the Wayne Planning Board and the Wayne Library Board, he was also past president of the Lions Club and past public relations director of District 16A Lions International. He was an active member of the Elks, the Wayne Post of the American Legion, Passaic County Republican Organization, Black Oak Ridge Homeowners Association, Pica Club, Wayne Township PTA, and the Wayne Musical Theatre group. He served as Passaic County special deputy sheriff, and treasurer of the Quad-City Incinerator Solid Waste Disposal Committee.

Senator Sisco was a former employee of the Erie Railroad Co. and served 5 years as a labor representative of the Order of Railroad Telegraphers. He was a representative with the Maryland Glass Co. and president of the Lor Mark Packaging Co. and T-Bowl International. He was director and member of the executive committee of the Ramapo Bank.

The Wayne Elks Lodge, of which Senator Sisco was a member, conducted services at the Moore's Home for Funerals, Wayne Chapel, and with State policemen as honorary pallbearers and Reverend Robert Grant of Embury United Methodist Church of Paterson, where Senator Sisco had served on the board of trustees, officiating, the Senator was laid to rest this morning in Laurel Grove Cemetery, Totowa, N.J.

I ask my colleagues to join with me in a moment of silent prayer to the memory of a distinguished American, Senator Edward M. Sisco from the Township of Wayne, County of Passaic, State of New Jersey. May his wife and children soon find abiding comfort in the faith that God has given them and the knowledge that Ed is now under His eternal care.

MAN'S INHUMANITY TO MAN—HOW LONG?

HON. WILLIAM J. SCHERLE

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 9, 1971

Mr. SCHERLE. Mr. Speaker, a child asks: "Where is daddy?" A mother asks: "How is my son?" A wife asks: "Is my husband alive or dead?"

Communist North Vietnam is sadistically practicing spiritual and mental genocide on over 1,600 American prisoners of war and their families.

How long?

INVASION OF LAOS

HON. ROBERT F. DRINAN

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 9, 1971

Mr. DRINAN. Mr. Speaker, I attach herewith an excellent document prepared by the Lawyers Committee on American Policy Towards Vietnam. This committee of which Mr. William L. Standard and Joseph H. Crown are co-chairman has an advisory council made up of distinguished scholars such as Professor Stanley Hoffman of Harvard University, Professor Hans J. Morgenthau of the University of Chicago, and Professor Richard A. Falk, Milbank Professor of International Law at Princeton University.

The statement below is a clear, cogent and compelling statement on the errors and evils of the invasion of Laos by the Nixon administration.

I include the statement as follows:

LAWYERS COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM

The Administration's argument that Congressional restrictions on the use of American ground combat troops in Laos and Cambodia authorize, by implication, the air war in those countries is sheer sophistry. War, under our Constitution, cannot be authorized by implication; military operations are valid only by affirmative action by Congress. In the present constitutional crisis, members of Congress have seemingly overlooked the National Commitments Resolution overwhelmingly adopted (70 to 16) by the Senate on June 25, 1969. This Resolution states (so far as here pertinent):

"Resolved, That (1) a national commitment for the purpose of this resolution means the use of the armed forces of the United States on foreign territory, * * * and (2) it is the sense of the Senate that a national commitment by the United States results only from affirmative action taken by the executive and legislative branches of the United States Government by means of a treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution of both houses of Congress specifically providing for such commitment."

It is indisputable that the President's use of American armed forces (warplanes, helicopter gunships, etc.) in Laos and Cambodia has not been authorized by any treaty, statute or concurrent resolution (specifically providing for such use). Indeed, our Government has solemnly signed the 1962 Geneva Accords, agreeing to respect the neutrality and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos. The President's actions in ordering American armed forces into Laos and Cambodia flagrantly contravenes the National Commitments Resolution which was adopted to preclude such Presidential unilateral action.

In the absence of affirmative action taken by Congress specifically authorizing military measures, the President's constitutional powers under the commander-in-chief clause do not authorize him to wage war. The Founding Fathers vested in Congress alone the sole power to commit our armed forces to hostilities abroad—to safeguard our nation against unchecked executive decisions to commit our country to a trial of force. The commander-in-chief clause merely placed the President at the top of the pyramid of military command—making him, in Alexander Hamilton's words, "first general and admiral of the Confederacy."

President Nixon cannot even rely on the Tonkin Gulf Resolution on which President Johnson relied as a legal basis for waging war in Vietnam for that Resolution has been

repealed and indeed the repealer was signed by President Nixon himself. There is therefore not a vestige of Congressional authorization for committing American forces to hostilities on foreign territory (Laos, Cambodia).

The national commitment resolution reflected an accurate description of the constitutional responsibilities of the President and Congress, adopted toward the end of restoring the proper constitutional balance. We believe the Foreign Relations Committee should take all measures necessary to assure compliance with the national commitments resolution and to bring to a halt the violation thereof.

Since Congress has not authorized military hostilities in Southeast Asia, President Nixon, in continuing to wage war in Indo-China, has been violating the Constitution. President Nixon's constitutional powers, as Commander-in-chief, to protect the lives of American troops do not authorize him to wage war, but are limited and restricted to measures necessary to the safe and expeditious withdrawal of these troops. Two years are far too long a period within which to have fulfilled that constitutional responsibility. The best way to protect the lives of American troops is to remove them from Vietnam—not to retain them to continue military operations.

Madame Binh, Foreign Minister of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, has officially proposed at the Paris Conference that if President Nixon will establish and abide by a date for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. troops, the P.R.G. will assure the safe withdrawal of our troops as well as immediate discussion for the release of prisoners of war. President Nixon has failed to explain why he rejects this offer and prefers instead a policy that jeopardizes the lives of our troops and postpones indefinitely the release of American prisoners of war. President Nixon's refusal to establish a timetable for complete U.S. withdrawal makes continuation of the war inevitable—as does his persistent support for Thieu and Ky, who have emphatically stated their opposition to the withdrawal of American military support. The wish to retain their present position as heads of a narrowly constituted military regime maintained by a massive foreign presence. But as Ambassador Harriman has so pointedly said, "Why should we give Thieu the right to dictate American policy? I can't conceive why anybody should give a veto to a foreign potentate no matter who he is." (Look, November 17, p. 39).

Congress, in enacting the Cooper-Church amendments, made clear that whatever the asserted powers of the President as Commander-in-chief, no ground troops or advisers were to be sent into Laos or Cambodia. The Cooper-Church amendments were intended to restrict American involvement in Indo-China not to exacerbate it. The air war being waged in Laos and Cambodia is contrary to the intent and spirit of Congressional restrictions as pointed out by Senator Mansfield in the T.V.-Radio program, "Face the Nation" (Jan. 4).

Since President Nixon lacks any constitutional power to wage war in Indo-China, Congress should act to halt such unconstitutional activities. If the President persists in violating the Constitution, it is Congress' responsibility to institute impeachment proceedings. Andrew Johnson was impeached for acts much less iniquitous.

We have been told that we are defending American honor; but many Americans and most of the world's nations feel that the spectacle of the enormous destructive U.S. military arsenal, especially in the case of the virtually unchallengeable power of the U.S. Air Force, arrayed against peasant soldiers, has defiled American honor as never before in our history.

We urge the Foreign Relations Committee

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It changes an open ear and mind to a closed, clenched fist.

The Boston Massacre and Kent State both look interesting in the history books, but they are complete dead ends.

Perhaps the heritage of those before us is like a ship's log: It reminds us of where the ship has gone and how the men who sailed the ship before us got her through other storms and shoals and kept the ship free.

Like any ship, she is not steered by the hand at the wheel alone. A single lonely man, free in his courage and defiance, pulling a sheetline, can alter the course of the ship, and of history. His actions can be called mutiny and treason, but he is in his own right and he is free.

In his freedom, that one man can guide the ship on to clearer waters.

EDITORIAL COMMENT ON REVENUE SHARING

HON. DAVID R. OBEY

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 9, 1971

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, the Milwaukee Journal took a recent editorial look at some revenue sharing proposals and found merit in the one proposed by Congressman HENRY REUSS and Senator HUBERT HUMPHREY.

Their proposal differs from others by requiring Governors in the second year of revenue sharing to come forward with plans for modernizing State and local governments.

How to improve the financial prospects of State and local governments is of more than passing interest to residents of Wisconsin, which supplies 1.98 percent of Federal tax revenues—excluding social security and other trust fund receipts—while receiving only 1.58 percent of categorical Federal grants paid to States.

The text of the editorial of February 25 follows:

REVENUE SHARING ON THE MOVE

The way appears to be opening for a compromise on President Nixon's far reaching revenue sharing proposals, with the administration backing down on its "no strings attached" grants to state and local governments. In Congress, too, there seems to be recognition that in the face of the need for revenue sharing of some sort it would be fatal to have a knock down, drag out battle over how to get the job done.

Secretary of the Treasury John Connally, in the first interview he has granted, told David Broder of the Washington Post that the president's goals could be accomplished by broadening present federal grant in aid programs should Congress reject the controversial \$5 billion no strings attached plan.

Murray L. Weidenbaum, an assistant secretary of the Treasury, indicated to the Joint Economic Committee of Congress that the administration might accept a revenue sharing program of a different size than it has proposed and with some new restrictions. Asked about an alternative plan proposed by two Democrats, Sen. Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota and Rep. Henry Reuss of Wisconsin, he said: "They have introduced a good bill, and I will not attack it." However, Weidenbaum said later that he hoped the administration bill would be adopted and that

if there were any compromise it would have to come from the White House.

Reuss and Humphrey have indicated that they want to find accommodation with the administration on the matter of revenue sharing.

The Reuss-Humphrey measure would not place any more restrictions than the administration would on how state and local governments spend any new money. But it would impose significant new requirements and restrictions in other ways. They would require governors, in the second year of revenue sharing, to come forward with plans for modernizing state and local governments. They recommend such reforms as annual legislative sessions, eased restrictions on borrowing and taxing powers of local governments, elimination of small units of government, formation of regional governmental bodies.

Reuss and Humphrey would also offer incentives for states to enact more "progressive" tax systems under which wealthy people would carry a higher share of the burden. This would entail instituting income tax systems in states that do not have them and raising such taxes in states that do. And, ultimately, the Reuss-Humphrey plan contemplates a federal takeover of welfare costs.

Revenue sharing on an increased basis seems inevitable. The administration and Congress seem to be moving toward a system mutually agreeable. No system that does not carry some restrictions or does not give incentives for better local management is desirable. It is here that compromise must come.

CONGRESS SHOULD VETO THE SST

HON. JAMES V. STANTON

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 9, 1971

Mr. JAMES V. STANTON. Mr. Speaker, the following editorial, which appeared in the Cleveland Plain Dealer on March 7, raises questions about the proposed SST project that its supporters have never completely answered. I believe this editorial will be of considerable interest to my colleagues in the House who also question the priority of the SST:

CONGRESS SHOULD VETO THE SST

The SST debate is on again in Congress. Supporters of the supersonic transport, including President Nixon, are back for more federal funds to continue development of two prototypes.

We think Congress should say "no."

The arguments for continuing the development of this plane now, when so many questions remain unanswered, are not strong.

The proponents say the work must go on to preserve jobs in the aviation industry. Cutting off federal support would cost 150,000 jobs, they say.

We agree it is important to maintain employment, but we think the capital, the design talent, the engineering genius and the work skills involved in the SST program would be better directed at other goals than production of an aircraft that could cut the trans-Atlantic flight time in half for the benefit of a relatively few jet-setters and businessmen.

Would it not serve a far greater public interest to put aviation experts at work designing short take-off aircraft that could help solve urban flight problems? Couldn't some of the managerial talent in the avia-

tion industry be used to solve mass transportation problems on the ground? Couldn't engine designers make a far more valuable contribution to society by fashioning a pollution-free auto engine?

We are sure America would earn the world's gratitude for halting the SST if it turns out, as some scientists suspect, that flights in the stratosphere could alter the world's climate or disturb the ozone layer that screens out harmful radiation from outer space.

No country should permit large-scale flights at SST altitudes until these environmental questions are answered. And it does not take two SST prototypes to find the answers. Existing supersonic military aircraft could be used for research.

A third argument advanced, weakest of the lot, is that the nation has already sunk more than \$90 million into the SST, and should continue funding the plane to protect the investment.

Many a poker player has lost a bundle following that philosophy. Sticking with a bad hand is not a good investment, but just the opposite. And the SST is a bad hand, a plane that very likely cannot be flown at a profit. British and French airline experts have the same doubts about their SST, the Concorde.

The Senate last year asked 16 leading economists—such men as Paul Samuelson, Walter Heller and Milton Friedman—what should be done about the SST. Fifteen of them said the U.S. should cut its losses and get out.

We think W. J. Baumol, one of the economists, put it well. "Neither the government nor private enterprise should be tempted to throw in good money after bad," he said. "Everything necessary should be done to facilitate the transfer of the capital and labor tied up in the development of the SST to other activities that do serve the public interest."

IN MEMORIAM TO NEW JERSEY STATE SENATOR, THE HONORABLE EDWARD M. SISCO

HON. ROBERT A. ROE

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 9, 1971

Mr. ROE. Mr. Speaker, during this past weekend the residents of my congressional district and the State of New Jersey were shocked and saddened by the sudden untimely death of one of our outstanding and distinguished statesmen and my dear personal friend, the Honorable Edward M. Sisco of Wayne, N.J. Our condolences are extended to his wife Evelyn; his daughters, Nancy and Lori; and his son Mark.

Senator Sisco suffered a stroke on February 26, 1971, and passed away on March 6, 1971, at the height of his public service career at the young age of 47 years. Let the history of his service to his fellowman, his dedication, devotion, and sincerity of purpose be forever remembered through this historical journal of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress.

He was born in Paterson, N.J., and was a resident of my hometown, Wayne, for almost 19 years. He was a graduate of the Paterson public school system—Paterson School 5 and Central High

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to forthwith endorse legislation prohibiting all offensive military action in Southeast Asia and setting an early deadline in 1971 for the withdrawal of all American forces.

We believe it would be a mistake to adopt the Javits bill designed to "regulate undeclared war" for under the guise of "protecting American lives" it could be construed to place a stamp of approval upon the military operations in Laos and Cambodia. In our view, it detracts from the force of the national commitments resolution.

Lamentably, too many members of Congress have accepted as valid the insidious false notion projected by the Administration that the President is authorized under the Commander-in-chief clause to do "anything, anywhere" merely by pronouncing the magic words—"for the protection of our troops". In *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer*, 343 U.S. 579, 641-42 (1952), the Supreme Court rejected similar claims made by the Executive as to the scope of power conferred by the Commander-in-chief clause. The Administration's claims would confer upon the President unlimited executive power to wage war—an evil which the Founding Fathers decided to exorcise when they vested the war making power in the Congress—in the body most broadly representative of the people. The tragedy in Southeast Asia bespeaks the calamitous price we have paid for the Presidential transgression of our Constitution. We urge this Committee to take the action we have proposed.

Respectfully,

WILLIAM L. STANDARD,
Cochairmen.

PROFESSOR ROBERT LEKACHMAN'S INCOMES POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS.

HON. WILLIAM F. RYAN

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 9, 1971

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, fashioning a sound economic policy which would control inflation without increasing unemployment constitutes one of our most critical problems. Robert Lekachman, professor of economics, State University of New York at Stony Brook, in testimony before the Joint Economic Committee on February 25, 1971, and the House Committee on Banking and Currency on February 26, 1971, showed his usual perspicacity and incisive analytical powers in examining this issue.

In outlining his proposed incomes policy, Professor Lekachman commented:

Wherever private economic power threatens public policy, Congress and the President must take pains to regulate the people and the organizations which exert the power. The more concentrated the power is, the greater is the menace to public purpose and the more immediate is the necessity of public intervention.

I include in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD the full text of Professor Lekachman's testimonies, which I commend to my colleagues:

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE OF ROBERT LEKACHMAN, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS, STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT STONY BROOK, FEBRUARY 25, 1971

There is no need here to reiterate the failures of the initial Administration game plan. Mr. Nixon's original promise to control inflation without significantly increasing un-

employment has been translated in real life into 6 per cent unemployment and consumer price inflation of approximately the same figure. The tale is as familiar as it is dispiriting.

I intend today to identify the reasons why Nixon economic policy Mark II is only marginally superior to its discredited predecessor. Here the President's celebrated remark, "I am now a Keynesian in economics", ought to be evaluated within the context of the present adequacy of Keynesian policy. Keynes himself had an opinion worth recalling about the durability of economic ideas and the relationship between such ideas and political action. In the closing paragraph of "The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money," published in England at the end of 1935, he had this to say:

"... the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from all intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist."

It would not have shocked Keynes, the owner of one of the century's most agile minds, to observe that after a third of a century his theories of economic behavior and economic policy required drastic revision. Were he still alive, he would no doubt be leading the revisionists.

Certainly this Administration's Keynesianism is timid at least even by the criteria of 1935. The Administration now estimates a budget deficit of \$18.6 billion in fiscal 1971. Obviously this substantial sum was too small to overcome the forces of recession, as the unemployment and output statistics demonstrate. Hence it is not intuitively obvious why a substantially smaller deficit of \$1.6 billion for fiscal 1972 should be the salvation of the economy. The difficulties in the path of aspiring true believers are accentuated by the refusal of both the Council of Economic Advisers and the Office of Budget and Management to make the detailed sectoral forecasts upon which administration economists have in the past relied.

One explanation of the omission might be the presence in the White House of a powerful surrogate for Dr. Milton Friedman, the puissant Dr. George Schultz. An alternative explanation is the pessimism which such detailed inquiry is highly likely to instill. The respected University of Michigan continuing survey of consumer attitudes and intentions identifies few signs that ordinary Americans, afflicted by uncertainties about prices and jobs, are about to turn cheerful, run to the stores, and happily increase their burden of debt. Indeed wistful expectations that consumers will save less and spend more appear to be based on little more than the historical observation that in most years consumers have saved smaller percentages of their disposable income than lately they have been doing.

Will business investment be the answer? According to recent surveys, business spending on capital goods, a key element in any sustained expansion, will increase only moderately during the rest of 1971. If, as is now anticipated, dollar expenditures on capital goods rise by under 2 per cent, real investment will of course shrink, possibly by as much as 3-4 per cent. Nor are the revised depreciation rules a panacea. At Harvard, Professor Dale Jorgenson's econometric inquiries lead to the conclusion that in the short run the new rules will have little impact. I might observe parenthetically that this new \$2.5 billion boon to corporations deserves inclusion in the next compilation of tax expenditures made by the Treasury. Although the tax expenditure notion was a parting Democratic gift by Stanley Surrey to the incoming Administration, its usefulness transcends partisan considerations.

The insufficiency of budgetary stimulus and the implausibility of consumer and investment revival, compel me to share the widespread skepticism in my trade about the ability of the economy to travel within hailing distance of the President's three 1971 targets, GNP of \$1,065 billion, inflation tapering to 3 per cent by year's end, and unemployment obediently declining by the same date to below 5 per cent. Unless Congress, as I believe and hope it will do, supplies the additional budgetary stimulus, there is nowhere visible the expansionary forces upon which the Administration rather mysteriously is counting.

Here I come to the major signs of decrepitude in the Administration brand of simple-minded Keynesianism. If by some chance the rate of economic expansion picks up speed, in dutiful accord with the predictions of the magical new monetarist model in high favor in the Office of Budget and Management, the White House will collide with a major uncertainty, the willingness of Dr. Arthur F. Burns and his Federal Reserve Board colleagues to underwrite a new inflationary impetus by expanding the money supply at the minimum 6 per cent rate favored by Dr. McCracken and his colleagues at the Council of Economic Advisers. What is unhappily quite possible is a scenario of the following variety: an acceleration of price inflation, a reduction by the Federal Reserve in the rate at which it creates new money, and finally either a replay of the Treasury-Federal Reserve confrontations of the Truman era or a retreat by the White House from fiscal expansion. Either outcome is guaranteed to nip an emerging recovery long before it flowers. Once faith and hope are excluded, there is no special reason to anticipate a noninflationary expansion of the character predicted by the Administration.

II

The contours of workable economic policy are not very difficult to sketch. Sensible economists and politicians accept the death of laissez-faire and do not flinch from the facts of economic power. Prices, incomes, and employment are heavily influenced by the decisions of the giant oligopolies which dominate manufacturing, the major unions which face them across collective bargaining tables, and the AMA-teaching hospital complex which determines the structure of medical costs. The potentates who run these organizations are of course influenced by market forces.

Nevertheless, typically they exercise considerable discretion in their responses to market exigencies. Thus it was that Bethlehem Steel, in the middle of a spell of flagging sales and fierce competition from foreign steelmakers, could propose to raise many of its prices over 12 per cent. It was securely protected from any unseemly price competition from its rivals in the American industry and certain that these rivals would speedily follow Bethlehem's price lead. Although Presidential intervention halted the projected price escalation, there remains something odd about increasing prices in the face of declining sales. Equally odd from the standpoint of competitive theory has been the ability of construction unions to bargain for wage increases as large as 25 per cent despite 11 per cent unemployment among building trades workers.

Both cases are almost random illustrations of the realities of market power. The concentration of this power enabled Bethlehem to choose higher prices and smaller sales in preference to lower prices and larger sales. The same circumstances permitted the construction unions tacitly to bargain for fewer jobs at higher pay rather than more jobs at lower wage rates. As Adam Smith wrote in 1776, what renders the greed of businessmen harmless and even socially beneficial is the pressure of competitive markets upon costs and prices. Where this pressure is absent for want of competitive markets, the

argument is compelling either for militant anti-trust enforcement and consequently fragmenting of large corporations or for vigorous incomes policy. Since I take public support for radical anti-trust to be imperceptible but public approval of wage and price control to be substantial, I find economic logic and political feasibility in harmony.

Effective incomes policy in 1971 implies a good deal more than a revival of jawboning or even a combination of jawboning with the resurrection of the wage-price guideposts. Although there is growing evidence that the guideposts did have a perceptible anti-inflationary impact, they operated at their best in an era different from ours, a period which trailed after eight years of slow economic growth, three recessions, and high average rates of unemployment. Although the social costs of Eisenhower economic policy were to high to encourage repetition of the experience, it must be conceded that eight years of frugality certainly did rid Americans of inflationary expectations.

However, inflationary expectations remain a fact of life in the present. The need arises, therefore, for stronger medicine, in the shape of mandatory controls. My own preference combines a dash of Robert Roosa with a dram of J. K. Galbraith. Which is to say that to me it makes sense to freeze wages and prices for six months and employ the time to design a set of selective wage and price controls à la Galbraith. I share Galbraith's view that the place to impose the controls is where the markets are least free. This is of course administratively convenient: it is far easier to regulate *Fortune's* elite list of the top 500 industrial corporations and the unions with which they deal than it is supervise myriads of small businessmen and merchants.

If the economy in 1971 is to move into a vigorous recovery, monetary and fiscal policy must march in step. It is almost certain that the prerequisite for such disciplined harmony of movement is administrative restraint of the key wage and price decisions. Such restraint will allay the inflationary fears of the central bankers and encourage the White House to persevere in its promise of budgetary stimulation.

The final component of successful post-Keynesian economic policy focuses upon employment. My co-panelist Dr. George Perry has recently conducted an important inquiry into recent changes in the Phillips curve trade-off between unemployment and inflation. The labor force is now composed of a growing percentage of female and young workers. Both groups suffer from higher than average unemployment rates. An implication of this demographic shift is the tendency of prices to stir menacingly at overall rates of unemployment which are unacceptably high, on the order of 5 per cent. A decade or so ago, the danger point was 1 or even 1½ per cent lower.

What follows is not the counsel of despair that we should give up on either employment or inflation. The moral is different. Sophisticated policy which successfully reconciles low rates of unemployment with successful price strategy requires attention to manpower as well as to incomes. Unfortunately the President vetoed a promising Congressional initiative, last session's attempt to authorize a modest number of public service jobs in hospitals, parks, museums, law enforcement agencies, and schools. Only a few years ago, President Johnson's automation commission estimated that there were over 5 million unfilled jobs in the public sector at existing levels of staffing and administration. In 1971 the number is unlikely to be smaller. A good public employment program would serve two desirable ends. It would alleviate the chronic manpower shortages to which public agencies are prey and

it would cope with a component of unemployment peculiarly intractable to monetary and fiscal policies.

III

Briefly to recapitulate my four recommendations, I begin with the identification of a need for substantially more fiscal stimulus from the federal budget than the President contemplates. At a guess, a full-employment budget deficit of \$10 billion would make a proper target. After Congress has done its work, I hope that Paul Samuelson will be moved to repeat the praise of your body which he expressed last year in the wake of Congressional additions to White House budget requests.

The rate of monetary expansion should rise to something over 6 per cent, possibly as high as 8 per cent.

An incomes policy fully equipped with sharp teeth is essential partly to mollify the monetary authorities, but still more to mitigate the inequities which attend continued inflation.

Finally, the assault upon unemployment must contain structural as well as aggregative elements, notably manpower training and public sector employment. As a Democrat I recall with a certain pleasure that the 1968 platform of my party incorporated a pledge to move toward a condition in which the federal government would become the employer of last resort. Even though the 1968 presidential race turned out badly, the voters were prudent enough to retain Democratic majorities in both houses.

It is something, I suppose, that that practical man, Mr. Nixon, has attached himself to an economic policy which was quite up-to-date two or three decades ago. This is not enough. The post-Keynesian universe demands attention to the facts of economic power and the circumstances of groups unable to protect themselves in markets partly free and partly privately dominated.

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT LERKACHMAN, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS, STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT STONY BROOK BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, FEBRUARY 26, 1971

In preparation for my appearance before this Committee, I took the sensible precaution of examining the record of your Hearings on June and July of last year. As I suspected, I discovered that I was in the slightly embarrassing situation for an academic economist of finding myself in substantial agreement with two of your earlier witnesses, Dr. Robert Roosa and Professor J. K. Galbraith. I am consoled by the reflection that they are two of the wisest and most ingenious members of my profession.

Like them I judge that the best feasible incomes policy commences with a freeze of wages, prices, and, I would add, dividends. While the freeze is in force, the President, in consultation with leaders of the major private interests involved, should design a workable scheme of wage, price, and dividend regulation. The President shall be required to present his proposed plan of operation to Congress for approval. After such approval is registered, the President will be empowered to release from the freeze the vast majority of enterprises which operate in competitive markets. Remaining under control will be prices, wages, and dividends in industries dominated by large corporations engaged in bargaining with national trade unions.

Although I bring no new wisdom in support of these conclusions, old arguments remain persuasive. It is a hobby of conservative politicians and a majority of my professional brethren to exaggerate the extent to which the American economy is directed by free market forces. Although there is admittedly a sphere in which competition organizes economic activity and generates

wages and prices, it is equally certain that the public utilities and much of manufacturing are organized as monopolies or oligopolies. And there are services, notably medicine, whose cost and fee structure has been decisively shaped by the professions capacity to regulate the training and inflow of new entrants, influence the running of hospitals, and determine the character of the medical marketplace.

Free markets produce socially tolerable results not because businessmen are particularly astute or exceptionally altruistic but because the pressure of rivalry curbs avarice and promotes efficiency. Such was the wisdom of Adam Smith. Such is much political and economic wisdom in 1971. A logical corollary is not always emphasized: in the many instances where markets are not competitive, the checks to avarice and the stimuli to efficiency operate with varying degrees of imperfection. It follows also that the price and wage policies which private market power allow are not necessarily in the public interest. The Nixon Administrations almost theological reverence for free markets leads its members to overlook the scarcity of such markets and the determination of many wage and prices by a comparatively short list of quite identifiable corporations, trade unions, and professional societies such as the American Medical Association.

Although the men of power who manage the affairs of such entities are less than totally insulated from demand and supply conditions in the markets where they hawk their wares, it is simple common sense to note that the price setters and the wage negotiators enjoy considerable discretion in the ways they choose to respond to their economic environment. Two illustrations underline the generalization. Bethlehem could rationally propose to raise structural steel prices over 12 per cent because it was protected by the knowledge that, faithful to ancient practice, the remainder of the industry would follow the price leader. Although the White House in what some suspect to have been a charade talked the increase down to 8 per cent or so, there remains something odd about any increase at all for an industry whose sales have been flagging and whose domestic markets have been invaded by agile foreigners, from whom the industry's leaders cry for protection. On the wage side, there are as usual the construction unions which, undeterred by 11 per cent unemployment among their members, have negotiated wage settlements in the 25 per cent range. Such behavior is not wicked. Market power enables the steel industry to choose a combination of higher prices and lower tonnage rather than a package of lower prices and larger tonnage. The construction unions exert similar power to select fewer jobs at higher wage rates in preference to more jobs at lower wages. One could very readily argue—indeed I do so, that neither steel nor construction supports a public interest which is much better promoted by lower prices, larger output, higher employment, and greater economic activity.

I draw a simple moral. Wherever private economic power threatens public policy, Congress and the President must take pains to regulate the people and the organizations which exert the power. The more concentrated the power is, the greater is the menace to public purpose and the more immediate is the necessity of public intervention.

II

For the reasons that immediately follow, I believe 1971 economic policy to be threatened by the probable exercise of private economic power.

Let us consider the character of 1971 needs and the responses to them by the Administration. In one of the more remarkable conversions of our day, Mr. Nixon has de-

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 2697

WHY WE FIGHT IN LAOS

Mr. SCOTT, Mr. President, Walter Rostow, foreign affairs adviser to President Johnson, the other day wrote an excellent article, that appeared in the New York Times, detailing the history of why our support troops are backing up the South Vietnamese in Laos. Mr. Rostow makes the important point that with the closing off of the Cambodian supply route in 1970, the Laos corridor became the sole, major supply route into South Vietnam. As has been said time and again, we are buying time during the dry season to hurt the enemy in his effort to make war. We are succeeding in our mission. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this fine article by Mr. Rostow be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

WHY WE FIGHT IN LAOS

(By W. W. Rostow)

AUSTIN, TEX.—As the critical battle shapes up for control over the infiltration routes through Laos during the current dry season, it may be useful to recall the history of that critical piece of the world's real estate.

The Hanoi delegation returned from the post-Sputnik conference in Moscow in November, 1957, content that the policies agreed to there permitted the reopening of attack on South Vietnam. Speaking to a group of North Vietnamese officials on Dec. 7, 1957, Le Duan said: "The Moscow documents have not only confirmed the line and created favorable conditions for North Vietnam to advance toward Socialism but have also shown the path of struggle for national liberation and have created favorable conditions for the revolutionary movement in South Vietnam."

By the second half of 1958 violence in South Vietnam began to increase. South Vietnamese political and military cadres, brought north in 1954, were infiltrated through the Laos corridor, joining the expanded Vietcong effort in the south. By December, 1958, there were clashes between regular North Vietnamese and Lao forces near Tchepone. This was part of the background to the grant of emergency powers to the Government of Laos in January 1959 and the coming into the Government of several army officers. But the Government in Vientiane lacked the power to assert sovereignty over its territory in the face of Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese opposition. By Jan. 20, 1967, Laos was in almost total political and military disarray.

President Kennedy convinced the Communists in his first three months that a takeover of Laos would be resisted by the United States. As a result, the Geneva Conference on Laos opened in May, 1961, against the background of a precarious cease-fire. The United States was prepared to accept a neutral Laos, headed by Souvanna Phouma; but it negotiated hard to make that neutrality real. The Laos Accords were signed on July 23, 1962. The signatories agreed that they would not introduce into Laos military personnel in any form and that they would not use the territory of Laos for interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

In addition, Harriman negotiated an understanding with Pushkin, the Soviet delegate, that Moscow would assume responsibility for assuring that the provisions of the Laos Accords would be honored by Hanoi, including explicitly an end to the transit of Laos against South Vietnam. This was not a casual understanding. It was an agreement negotiated over many months without ambiguity in either Government.

The Laos Accords went into effect in the first week of October, 1962. It was clear immediately that Hanoi did not intend to honor the agreement: infiltration continued. Moscow was apparently not prepared to accept the costs of forcing Hanoi's compliance. And the United States failed to act decisively, which might have strengthened Moscow's hand in Hanoi.

(I have said on another occasion—The New York Times, Jan. 5, 1969—that I regard the failure of the Kennedy Administration to insist promptly on the honoring of the Laos Accords of 1962 as the greatest single error in policy of the 1960's; although it is not difficult to understand why President Kennedy, in the wake of the Cuba missile crisis and with things then going relatively well in South Vietnam, would have chosen not to initiate a major crisis at that time.)

Given the arithmetic of guerrilla warfare, the infiltration of, say, 500 Communist cadres a month from the North was a most serious matter in 1961-63. Normally one guerrilla ties down 10 or 15 on the defending side.

In 1964 the meaning of infiltration changed. In the wake of the 1963 political crisis in South Vietnam, Hanoi made the momentous decision to introduce its regular forces into the battle. They came through Laos.

For a time supplies came in directly by coastal shipping until choked off by the American and South Vietnamese navies. And Hanoi made arrangements with Sihanouk for supply through Cambodia on a scale greater, even, than was understood at the time. Nevertheless, the war which Southeast Asia and all of us have suffered since 1964 could never have been mounted without the illegal use of the Laos trails.

With the closing off of the Cambodian supply route in 1970, the Laos corridor became the sole major route into South Vietnam.

Men have differed in the past and they may differ now over the meaning of this tale and the lessons to be drawn from it. For example, Roger Hilsman and I debated temperately the military significance of infiltration in 1962. But I agree with this passage from his "To Move a Nation" (p. 155): "The lessons of the Laos crises are many—that agreements with the Communists can be kept by and large intact, for example, but only if one is willing to keep up the same level of commitment to keep the agreement as one was willing to use to obtain it in the first place."

What the South Vietnamese are now trying to do is to enforce an agreement which Hanoi and Peking freely signed in July 1962; which Moscow undertook to guarantee; and for which the United States continues to bear an inescapable responsibility.

REVENUE SHARING AND FEDERAL WELFARE TAKEOVER

Mr. HUMPHREY, Mr. President, national debate and discussion on revenue-sharing and other proposals to help State and local governments is increasing. This is very heartening. States and localities who are in critical condition and literally must be kept alive through a transfusion of Federal funds.

One of the proposals being circulated unofficially is Representative MILLS' Federal takeover of welfare costs. This proposal, which includes reform of the present system, is excellent and will certainly figure in any welfare legislation. The Federal Government should assume the total costs of welfare over a 3- or 4-year period.

However, as an editorial from the Christian Science Monitor of March 1, Reuss and I believe that merely federalizing welfare would not provide assistance to those areas that do not have high welfare costs yet do have a critical need of funds if they are to continue essential services.

I believe that a combination of welfare-reform and Federal financing plus revenue-sharing, as suggested in the Humphrey-Reuss bill (S. 241), would provide a balanced assistance program to local governments.

It is not important whose program is implemented. What is important is that this vitally needed assistance reach our States and localities as soon as possible and under conditions that assure its being spent effectively and well.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the editorial be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

REVENUE SHARING CHALLENGED

Not all the arguments are in on the revenue-sharing battle that looms in Congress, but at this reading it looks as though the plan of Rep. Wilbur Mills for federal takeover of all welfare costs will give revenue sharing a run for the money.

Strong philosophical argument can be made in its favor.

First, it's simple. National minimum standards would be set to determine who is a bona fide welfare client. Once a poor family proves its eligibility, monthly checks would start flowing from a computerized system, not unlike the social security system. The present creaking welfare structure, with its hordes of welfare caseworkers, would fade away gradually. Welfare frauds would be discouraged by heavy penalties attached to a federal crime.

For congressmen, the Mills formula has one major appeal: it gets away from the Nixon plan to give away funds without strings.

On the other hand, revenue sharing under the Nixon plan would be less costly. It proposes a flat \$5 billion increase to the \$10 billion of aid already given cities and states. But big city mayors complain that the formula would bring them fewer dollars and pump more funds into the affluent suburbs.

In the face of growing interest in the Mills plan, the administration is showing willingness to compromise. Mr. Nixon has signaled Congress he would consider taking over some welfare costs, along with revenue sharing. (Indeed, his program to take 225,000 welfare recipients off the rolls by creating new jobs for them is a move in this direction.)

Even so, some thoughtful objections are being made to the whole concept of revenue sharing. High among these is that it would take the heat off those states that are not holding up their own end by passing a graduated corporate and individual income tax. It fails to spur states to cut out costly patronage jobs. And it gives the power to spend tax money to persons not responsible for collecting it.

Sen. Henry Reuss and Sen. Hubert Humphrey offer a compromise bill that combines the Nixon-Mills versions, though takeover of welfare would be spread out over a period of time. A new twist, not without merit, would require states to modernize their governments, knock out tiny inefficient units, and create new regional bodies.

The key question, however, must be: Which approach offers most relief to the cities and states in the most practical way, and with minimum opportunity for boondoggling? Mr. Nixon will have to work hard to convince wary congressmen that revenue sharing carries the advantage in these respects.

DOOMSAYERS—THE AMERICAN HYPOCHONDRIACS

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, to these conservative eyes, it is somewhat of a special event when one of the national weekly magazines prints a serious article reminding us as a people to keep our bearings in the stream of history. For conservatives, the lessons of the past have always served as a basic test against which we might judge the wisdom and practicality of current vogues, goals, ethics, beliefs, and demands for changes.

This is why I was so delighted recently upon discovering a scholarly presentation of the lasting values inherent in history. Though the article appeared nearly 8 months ago in the July 6, 1970, issue of Newsweek, its message remains so timely I would like to bring it to the attention of any Senator who, like me, may have overlooked it until now.

The piece was written by Dr. Daniel J. Boorstin, who is well known as Director of the Smithsonian Institution's National Museum of Science and Technology. Entitled "A Case of Hypochondria," his brief paper devastatingly exposes the ridiculous preoccupation which so many home-grown critics have with self-doubt and worry about the health of our Nation.

According to Dr. Boorstin, these critics have formed a cult of doomsayers who are overwhelmed by the ailments of the instant moment. "In a word," Dr. Boorstin warns, "we have lost our sense of history." As a result, lacking the materials of historical comparison, "We are left with nothing but abstractions, nothing but baseless utopias to compare ourselves with."

Mr. President, in the midst of a current fashion of scare headlines and hourly crises, it is refreshing to discover a sensible voice guiding our sights back to the real story of human history. In fact, I agree with Dr. Boorstin the best antidote "against ruthless absolutes and simple-minded utopias has been American history itself." It is my belief an examination of the past our people lived and of their problems and conditions and capabilities for meeting them will reveal how truly far we as a great nation have come. At the same time, a study of the past will give a sense of proportion and timing to our capacity for solving contemporary social concerns.

Mr. President, there is no question that Dr. Boorstin's penetrating article warrants our deep attention as we seek to work on national issues and distinguish honest solutions from illusory ones. For this reason, I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

A CASE OF HYPOCHONDRIA

(By Daniel J. Boorstin)

Our inventive, up-to-the-minute, wealthy democracy makes new tests of the human spirit. Our very instruments of education, of information and of "progress" make it harder every day for us to keep our bearings in the larger universe, in the stream of history and the whole world of peoples who feel strong ties to their past. A new price of our American standard of living is our imprisonment in the present.

That imprisonment tempts us to a morbid preoccupation with ourselves, and so induces hypochondria. That, the dictionary tells us, is "an abnormal condition characterized by a depressed emotional state and imaginary ill health; excessive worry or talk about one's health." We think we are the beginning and the end of the world. And as a result we get our nation and our lives, our strengths and our ailments, quite out of focus.

We will not be on the way to curing our national hypochondria unless we first accept the unfashionable possibility that many of our national ills are imaginary and that others may not be as serious as we imagine. Unless we begin to believe that we won't be dead before morning, we may not be up to the daily tasks of a healthy life.

We are overwhelmed by the instant moment—headlined in this morning's newspaper and flashed on this hour's newscast. As a result we can't see the whole real world around us. We don't see the actual condition of our long-lived body-national. And so we can't see clearly whatever may be the real ailments from which we actually suffer.

In a word, we have lost our sense of history. In our schools, the story of our nation has been displaced by "social studies"—which is the study of what ails us. In our churches the effort to see man sub specie aeternitatis has been displaced by the "social gospel"—which is the polemic against the supposed special evils of our time. Our book publishers and literary reviewers no longer seek the timeless and the durable, but spend most of their efforts in fruitless search for a la mode "social commentary"—which they pray won't be out of date when the issue goes to press in two weeks or when the manuscript becomes a book in six months. Our merchandizers frantically devise their 1970½ models (when will the 1970¾'s arrive?) which will cease to be vogueish when their sequels appear three months hence. Neither our classroom lessons nor our sermons nor our books nor the things we live with nor the houses we live in are any longer strong ties to our past. We have become a nation of short-term doomsayers.

Without the materials of historical comparison, having lost our traditional respect for the wisdom of ancestors and the culture of kindred nations, we are left with nothing but abstractions, nothing but baseless utopias to compare ourselves with. No wonder, then, that so many of our distraught citizens label us as the worst nation in the world, or the bane of human history (as some of our noisiest young people and a few disoriented Negroes tell us). For we have wandered out of history. And all in the name of virtue and social conscience!

We have lost interest in the real examples from the human past which alone can help us shape standards of the humanly possible. So we compare ours with a mythical Trouble-Free World, where all mankind was at peace. We talk about the War in Vietnam as if it were the first war in American history—or at least the first to which many Americans were opposed. We condemn our nation for not yet having attained perfect justice, and

we forget that ours is the most motley and miscellaneous great nation of history—the first to use the full force of law and constitutions and to enlist the vast majority of its citizens in a strenuous quest for justice for all races and ages and religions.

We flagellate ourselves as "poverty ridden"—by comparison only with some mythical time when there was no bottom 20 percent in the economic scale. We sputter against The Polluted Environment—as if it was invented in the age of the automobile. We compare our smoggy air not with the odor of horsedung and the plague of flies, and the smell of garbage and human excrement which filled cities in the past, but with the honeysuckle perfumes of some nonexistent City Beautiful. We forget that even if the water in many cities today is not as spring-pure as palatable as we would like, for most of history the water of the cities (and of the countryside) was undrinkable. We reproach ourselves for the ills of disease and malnourishment, and forget that until recently enteritis and measles and whooping cough, diphtheria and typhoid, were killing diseases of childhood, puerperal fever plagued mothers in childbirth, polio was a summer monster.

Flooded by screaming headlines and hourly televised "news" melodramas of dissent and "revolution," we haunt ourselves with the illusory ideal of some "whole nation" which had a deep and outspoken "faith" in its "values."

We become so obsessed by where we are that we forget where we came from and how we got here. No wonder that we begin to lack the courage to confront the normal ills of modern history's most diverse, growing, bubbling Nation of Nations.

Our national hypochondria is compounded by distinctively American characteristics. The American belief in speed, which led us to build railroads farther and faster than any other nation, to invent "quick-lunch" and self-service to save the terrible ten-minute wait, to build automobiles and highways so we can commute at 70 miles an hour, which made us a nation of instant cities, instant coffee, TV-dinners, and instant everything, has bred in us a colossal impatience. Any social problem that can't be solved instantly by money and legislation seems fatal. Our appliances and our buildings and our very lives seem out of date even before they are ready for occupancy. What can't be done right now seems hardly worth doing at all.

Some of these current attitudes are themselves the late-twentieth-century perversions of the old American Booster Spirit, which has had no precise parallel anywhere else. Totalitarian nations have been marked by their obsession with "planning"—with five-year plans and ten-year plans. But planning expresses willingness to accept a sharp distinction between present and future, between the way things are and the way they might be. And that distinction has never been too popular in the U.S.A. The nineteenth-century Boosters of Western cities defended their extravagant boasts by saying there was no reason to wait, if you were actually bragging only about things that were certain to happen. To them the beauties of Oleopolis or Gopher City were none the less real simply because "they had not yet gone through the formality of taking place."

This Booster-Vagueness has always made Americans wonderfully unpedantic about the distinction between the present and the future. The amiable vagueness, which once gave an optimistic nineteenth-century America the energy and the hope to go on, still survives. But in a hypochondriac twentieth-century America its effects can be disastrous

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the closed minds which we have been so quick to condemn in others.

Our research, and sometimes our pretensions to research, have interfered with our teaching. Light courses loads have been used as opportunities not to devote more time to individual students, but to pursue our own interests, whether or not these interests are of benefit to those whom we teach. Our offices are more often closed than open to students and much of our teaching has been left to the least experienced. Our research interests have too often been dictated by available funds which have led to an eager relinquishing of autonomy and self-direction. The excess of wealth that has mushroomed our research has been matched by our hubristic claims that have created unrealistic expectations among the students and in the community.

Not everyone is guilty, but to whatever extent these charges are applicable to institutions and individuals—to the University of Buffalo, to you and to me—then to that extent the institutions and the individuals have abrogated their responsibility to the purpose of higher education. This denial, this arrogance of self-interest, must be accorded its own proper role as a factor in the erosion of confidence in the academic profession. For it is a pervasive sense of disenchantment, not alone a reaction to campus disorder, which has created the current threat to autonomy and academic freedom.

III

There are many who now recommend that research institutes, separate from the universities, be created; that universities no longer act as certification boards for employers in business and in the professions; and that the public demand for the services of higher education be limited. These recommendations—which come from within the university as well as from without—suggest that there is a widespread belief that the university has over-extended itself, that it has attempted to fill too many roles.

These proposals may have some merit, but I do not believe that we are going to restore the trust we have lost simply by proposing remedies dependent upon elements outside the university. The teaching, research and service functions have been part of the role of universities since their creation in medieval times, and I do not foresee a time when one or another of them will be abandoned; they are too interrelated.

I believe first we must recognize that teaching is primary, and that research and service are valuable to the university in the degree to which they facilitate the former. It is through teaching that the university and the individual in the university will make their broadest contribution to the welfare of society. The teacher must never allow the pursuit of his own interests to lead to neglect of the intellectual growth of his students.

As the largest graduate center in the State University of New York, this institution at Buffalo has a particular obligation to research. But, if we insist that our activities in both the pure and applied fields are to be carefully selected to enhance the teaching process, then we will maintain our integrity as a true institution of learning. Realistically, this selection will have to be made among interests which individuals, businesses, foundations, and governments are willing to finance. It would be foolish to argue that social utility is not a powerful institutional influence. Nevertheless, careful selection among our options can preserve our right to define our own priorities while simultaneously serving societal advancement.

Public service, apart from the service inherent in teaching and research, has occupied during the last several years an in-

creasing amount of time and resources within the university. It is obvious by now, however, that the university cannot be honed into a cutting edge for social change. That role would require attributes that are antithetical to the objectivity demanded by scholarship. Therefore, in exercising this function we must make sure that our programs of service have a broad educational value, and that an advocacy of special interests does not usurp the critical stance that the university at all times must maintain.

IV

Can the responsibilities of the university community be observed without a formal and enforceable code of ethics? It is true that our universities have become more legalistic in nature as a result of campus disorders. Nevertheless, the disciplinary codes and due process measures that have been drawn up to deal with these problems have not stilled the public outcry for yet more stringent regulations.

Reacting to this external pressure and out of a genuine concern for the viability of freedom on the campus, many educators have suggested the need for a well-defined code which includes an enforcement mechanism. The Association of American University Professors recently released a statement on freedom and responsibility; the American Association of State Colleges and Universities has issued its own statement on "academic freedom, responsibility, and tenure"; and at both Berkeley and Stanford the faculties have been considering the strong enforcement of "codes."

I feel very strongly that this concern for professional ethics is healthy, for all too often in the past we have emphasized freedom without sufficient regard for responsibility. It is my personal hope, however, that California is not, as it has been labeled, "the nation's weather vane." I do not share the view of those persons who feel that the consensual and uncoded guidelines for academic freedom and academic responsibility are too ill-defined to be useful; and I do not want the University placed in the position of having to create a formal code and enforcement procedures as a means of avoiding that creation by others.

If this possibility can be averted, it will be done so only through institutional and individual commitment to self-discipline. It is this quality which enables us to sublimate our self-interests to the advancement of the human good and to thereby fulfill the purpose of higher education and of this University. The quality is intrinsic to scholarship; it is both our defense and our freedom.

The time has now come to reclaim it.

LEST WE FORGET

HON. JULIA BUTLER HANSEN

OF WASHINGTON

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, March 3, 1971

Mrs. HANSEN of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I want to join my distinguished colleagues who have taken this day to salute an organization of Americans who have courageously born the marks of our past wars.

I refer to the Disabled American Veterans, which now includes nearly 300,000 members in its 51st year of existence.

We have erected countless monuments of tribute to those who lost their lives carrying out our country's battles. But

because of their assimilation into civilian life, veterans disabled by those battles may not be so prominent in our minds. The work of the Disabled American Veterans of returning its members to productive civilian life deserves prominence, however, today and always.

Like one of our greatest Commanders in Chief, Abraham Lincoln, I believe what we say today will soon be forgotten. But the scars of battle borne by those maimed veterans cannot be obliterated. Disabled American Veterans, as an organization, will thus continue to have a great historic role to carry out in America.

The DAV's program of training and assistance to disabled veterans, I believe this to be one of the highest levels of citizenship in our Nation—which fought its first battles to establish itself as a Nation of freedom and opportunity.

FREE CHINA (CN-LAOS)

HON. JOHN G. SCHMITZ

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, March 3, 1971

Mr. SCHMITZ. Mr. Speaker, oftentimes it is helpful to see ourselves and what we do through the eyes of other peoples, to get their opinion of certain facets of U.S. foreign policy. This is not to say that we should tailor our policies to the desires of other nations, far from it, but rather that we should reflect on the other fellow's point of view in order to see if perhaps we might not have overlooked something in our own assessment.

Toward this end, I insert some comments from the press of Free China on the recent allied thrust into enemy held areas of Laos. These comments appeared in the February 21, 1971, edition of the Free China Weekly:

CHINESE PRESS OPINION: VIETNAMIZATION AND ASIANIZATION

United Daily News: Expansion of Vietnamization into Asianization is imperative to safeguard Indochina's peace and security.

Asian Communism is international. Its threat must be combatted by international efforts. All Asian democracies should render support and assistance to South Vietnam for strikes against Communist bases in Laos.

To protect American lives in the course of further troop withdrawals, the United States must assist the South Vietnamese offensive in Laos by any and all means.

The Chinese Communists have not forgotten the bitter lessons learned in the Korean War. They are adopting "indirect aggression" as their ultimate strategy and avoiding open warfare throughout Southeast Asia. The Chinese Reds are instigating Communists in all the Asian countries to launch "people's warfare" and bring about a "united front" of armed revolt.

The primary goal of Peking's strategy is to compel U.S. forces to withdraw from Vietnam. Peking can ignore the cutting of the Ho Chi Minh trail by South Vietnamese forces. The Chinese Reds know the Viet Cong and Pathet Lao can renew aggression when U.S. forces are gone from Vietnam.

New Life Daily News: Indochina's peace and security depend on the success of the

munities, dividing the city into more districts, each with a director.

The dialogue is ensuing. Community board meetings should be listened to. Legislation will be drafted, there may be a referendum put before the people and people should make their views known and be aware of the issues.

Question: What can be done about dogs in the streets?

Answer: (Mr. Kretschmer) One of his favorite issues. People walking dogs in the streets show disrespect for the city. It is not just aesthetically displeasing but it has become a health problem because the water in the streets washes into our rivers. One solution is changing the system of enforcing sanitation laws. Many violators are not punished because their violations are not worth the trouble of enforcement officers. He is proposing an environmental court to handle summons on computers to deal with repetitive offenders. High fines may be effective. In Hong Kong if a person litters the side walk, he can pay a fine of \$160. Such a severe system of fines could be effective.

Question: On holidays the Department of Sanitation doesn't pick up garbage. Couldn't building superintendents be notified not to place the garbage on the street on a holiday?

Answer: Notices are sent out but there is no way to enforce compliance. Superintendents just don't want to come in late on holidays to put the garbage out so that it can be picked up the next day. Nobody has ever been successful in anti-litter campaigns in New York City. We are about to start another massive advertising campaign to figure out ways to deal with garbage as a social problem.

Question: Isn't there a problem of getting private money into multiple dwelling housing in New York when rent control is so inhibitive?

Answer: (Mr. Walsh) 70% of the families in New York cannot afford the rents of private housing industries. One possible alternative is a massive rent subsidy program. The Senior Citizen exemption from the current rent increase means that the building doesn't get the amount of revenue that rent control itself says is necessary to maintain the building properly. There is a proposal now in the legislature to subsidize those increases. We will need in this country some kind of system to make sure people have decent shelter, clothing and food.

Question: Has use of refuse compactors ever been considered?

Answer: (Mr. Kretschmer) Local Law 14 now requires compactors or upgraded incinerators. But in some areas of such great importance, our technology hasn't done anything for us. The technology is either not concerned with our problems or has fallen apart. If the American economy, technology and ingenuity were put into our quality of life instead of into how many cars we produce, we really would have the kind of environment we want.

MAN'S INHUMANITY TO MAN— HOW LONG?

HON. WILLIAM J. SCHERLE

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, March 3, 1971

Mr. SCHERLE. Mr. Speaker, a child asks: "Where is daddy?" A mother asks: "How is my son?" A wife asks: "Is my husband alive or dead?"

Communist North Vietnam is sadistically practicing spiritual and mental genocide on over 1,600 American prisoners of war and their families.

How long?

REPRESSION BY DEFAULT

HON. JACK F. KEMP

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, March 3, 1971

Mr. KEMP. Mr. Speaker, Dr. Robert L. Ketter, the new president of the State University of New York at Buffalo, made an outstanding inaugural address on February 15, 1971.

He pointed out that if our institutions of higher learning do not put their own houses in order, the political establishment, in response to public pressure, will do it.

Buffalo State is the largest graduate center in the State university system in New York. I am sure under Dr. Ketter, Buffalo State will meet its responsibilities to develop programs with broad educational value rather than become "a cutting edge for social change."

The address follows:

REPRESSION BY DEFAULT

(By Robert L. Ketter, President, State University of New York at Buffalo)

Chancellor Boyer, Mr. Baird, members of the Council of State University of New York at Buffalo, members of the Board of Trustees of State University of New York, Distinguished Visitors, Delegates, members of the University faculty and student body, Reverend Clergy, Alumni, Ladies and Gentlemen.

This moment revives for me a feeling I experienced when I was first appointed to office and which I am sure all of my predecessors shared, for I am standing now, as they did, at the crossroads between tradition and innovation, between the imperative to preserve an inheritance from the past and the sense of the opportunity to give a shape to the future.

For each of my predecessors the interplay between tradition and innovation has had a unique meaning, since the point at which they meet shifts from generation to generation. In my opinion, the area of crucial concern here and now is the relation between academic freedom and academic responsibility. Therefore, on this occasion, I want to make that relationship the focus of my remarks.

I

In an article which appeared last August in one of the national dailies, it was reported that thirty-two states had enacted legislation designed specifically to control campus disorders. There has not yet been sufficient time to analyze fully the implications of these measures; nevertheless, I would submit that such laws are repressive at worst and at best, they are regressive, for they are certain to erode the institutional autonomy which is a prerequisite for true academic freedom.

Traditionally, universities have opposed any attempts to circumscribe their autonomy, reasoning that an attack against the conditions under which academic freedom exists is in fact an attack against academic freedom itself. In general, their opposition has not been misplaced; for the privilege of autonomy has rarely been granted without a struggle, and even then, society has demonstrated a reluctant acquiescence rather than a positive commitment to the concept.

Unfortunately, our concentration on preventing external interference has deflected our attention away from internal responsibilities. We have looked outward at the expense of looking inward, and now find ourselves faced with an uncomfortable paradox: our very preoccupation with external threat has helped to bring that threat about.

Nor has the internal neglect resulted only from our struggle for autonomy and academic freedom. It also has come out of arrogance and fear, an arrogance which has placed us above responsibility, and a fear which has paralyzed our will to adhere to the demands of responsibility even when we have perceived them.

Lewis Mayhew and numerous other educators have warned us of the gravity of the crisis that these attitudes have created. If the university does not put its own house in order, the political establishment, in response to public pressure, will attempt to do so. We will have squandered our inheritance of both autonomy and freedom.

We cannot continue to invite repression by default. It is imperative that we, ourselves, define our responsibilities and determine to meet them. This is one of the primary opportunities the future holds for each of us.

II

The mission of a university is to contribute to the welfare of society-through education. This contribution has traditionally been made in the areas of teaching, research and public service. To properly serve in these areas the university has required that it be given the autonomy which insures free inquiry into the truth of all phenomena, and the free dispensation of the results of that inquiry.

Samuel Capen, Chancellor of this University from 1922 to 1950, wrote that what we have asked is "to be protected against every form of reprisal" that the truth might provoke. This is to be given a uniquely privileged status, one which almost implies absolute freedom. Judge Learned Hand pointed to the danger in this and other such extreme interpretations: "A society in which men recognize no check upon their freedom," he said, "soon becomes a society where freedom is the possession of only a savage few. . . ."

The academic profession has recognized the validity of this warning and has sought to avoid the abuse of its freedom by self-imposed precepts: a reliance on scholarship rather than power, intellectual exchange rather than dogma, and above all humanity in its relations to others.

But academic freedom is now threatened. It is true that the university is one of many social institutions confronted today by a loss of confidence. It is also true that dissatisfaction with the university has been heightened by changes in other sectors of society. But we are still faced ultimately with the realization that the atmosphere of freedom on campus has been invaded. It has been invaded by those whose impatience and ill-conceived goals demand the destruction of the university as the only solution to the problems of an institution which reflects many of society's deficiencies and injustices. It has been invaded, too, by those who wish to suppress expression of unpopular views, who do not distinguish between violent revolt and peaceful dissent. The university has been peculiarly vulnerable to these invasions because its commitment to freedom and to the complexities of truth has often paralyzed its ability to act.

In reviewing recent educational history, it must be concluded that while less visible, no doubt because it was less volatile, serious abuses of academic freedom began to afflict universities in their early years of burgeoning affluence following World War II. These abuses were caused by arrogance, an arrogance which has done much to provoke the disorder which many have cited as the justification for the present threats to our autonomy. This haughtiness has been manifested in the imposition of an autocratic lecture system which too frequently has denied students the freedom of inquiry which we have claimed for ourselves. We have expected our own conclusions, expounded at length, to be returned dutifully at the end of the term. We have thus displayed in ourselves

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U.S. and South Vietnamese offensive against the Communists in Laos.

U.S. and South Vietnamese operations against the Communists in Laos is the first large-scale offensive of the Vietnam war. This move is important strategically because it seeks to combine Indochina's three battlefields into one. The morale and anti-Communist solidarity of South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos will be greatly strengthened.

Peiping has repeatedly protested against the Allied offensive in Laos and pledged to continue supporting Communists in the three Indochina nations. Peiping is trying to stimulate the emotions of U.S. anti-war elements and appeasers and arouse resistance to the Nixon administration.

The Chinese Communists are expanding the Indochina war. Chou En-lai's statement that "war has no boundaries" is a threat intended to test the reaction of the United States. Mainland China is still in a state of turmoil and Mao Tse-tung dares not become openly involved.

Washington must not forget the lesson learned in Cambodia last year. Full support should be given the South Vietnamese offensive in Laos, including the bombing of North Vietnam if necessary.

Central Daily News: The new military drive into Laos is much more important than last year's military operations in Cambodia by U.S. and South Vietnamese forces.

The campaign in Laos will help prevent Communist aggression and provide more time for Vietnamization. Communist supply lines to Cambodia and South Vietnam will be cut.

Cutting of the Ho Chi Minh trail is a big blow Hanoi. The South Vietnamese can do it again if the situation requires. Hanoi knows this route is no longer dependable.

China News: The cutting of the Ho Chi Minh trail and the successful defense of Cambodia would shorten the Indochina war.

American doves have so far made less noise than expected about the South Vietnamese advance into Laos.

This could be because the opposition is off to a slow start. More protests can be expected in time.

It also may be that some peace advocates recognize the necessity for doing something about the Communist build-up in Laos if the Vietnam war is ever to be ended.

Almost all North Vietnamese reinforcements and supplies now move into Cambodia and South Vietnam via the Ho Chi Minh trail running down the spine of Laos.

Kompong Som, the Cambodian port on the Gulf of Siam, is no longer open to Communist use.

That leaves only the Ho Chi Minh trail. Infiltration across the Demilitarized Zone and along South Vietnam's eastern and southern coasts is of minor consequence.

If the North Vietnamese cannot get at South Vietnam, the final phase of the war becomes an exercise of cleaning up the Viet Cong and remnant Hanoi forces.

South Vietnamese are already strong enough for that. This is manifest in the U.S. decision to back up the South Vietnamese army in Laos.

Should Saigon's forces fail, the future of Vietnamization would be placed in jeopardy. Free Vietnamese morale would be seriously and perhaps fatally undermined.

President Nixon and the Pentagon obviously believe the danger is slight. They are confident that with American air support but without American ground combat forces, the South Vietnamese are more than a match for the North Vietnamese regulars they will meet in Laos.

"This is, then, the supreme test of Vietnamization. The Vietnam war is coming down to its final denouncement."

FORTY AMPHETAMINE DOSES A YEAR FOR EVERY MAN, WOMAN, AND CHILD IN THE UNITED STATES

HON. CHARLES H. WILSON

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, March 3, 1971

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON. Mr. Speaker, last year I was one of those who sponsored the amendment which would have brought about restrictions on the number of amphetamines produced annually in this country. I continue to believe that there is absolutely no justification for four major drug manufacturers to spew forth no less than 8 billion bennies, dexies, goof balls, and pep pills—as they are commonly called—each year, while the actual medical need is for a small fraction of that number. As one who has consistently supported broad and far-reaching legislation to curtail the rampant spread of drug abuse in this country, I consider the continuing lack of restriction in this area to be a potential source for still more Americans—particularly the young—to be damaged by misuse of drugs.

Believing that the amphetamine issue can and should be again raised in the 92d Congress, I would like to offer for my colleagues' consideration a recent editorial broadcast on WCBS-TV New York. The station's spokesman outlines the issue very clearly and urges the adoption of legislation to plug this hole in the antidrug dam. I certainly concur with this editorial, the text of which follows:

WCBS-TV EDITORIAL

TOO MANY AMPHETAMINES

This may come as an unpleasant surprise to many people—especially parents of teenagers frightened by our ever-growing drug epidemic—but there are dangerous drugs legally manufactured in this country that are never used for medical purposes at all. They go, instead, to illicitly produce the ups and downs, the thrills and kicks of drug-abusers.

Take amphetamines for example. Amphetamines—or speed, bennies, pep pills, as they are known in the streets—are produced in such incredible numbers in this country that, in more ways than one, the figure is mind-boggling. Testimony before the House Select Committee on Crime showed that though the legitimate medical requirement for amphetamines is under a billion pills a year, there are some 8 billion pills produced. That's enough for every man, woman and child in the country to have 40 amphetamine doses a year.

It doesn't take much guesswork to know where all the extra billions of pills are going. Most wind up in the hands of youngsters, too often with the disastrous psychological reactions and brain damage that can result.

Crime Committee hearings described one manufacturer, now out of business, that shipped over a million amphetamines to a consignee in Mexico. Federal agents investigating the sale found the consignee's address was actually the 11th hole of a Tijuana golf course.

Despite abuses such as this, when the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Bill was passed by Congress last year, drug manufacturers were able to successfully lobby against ef-

orts to limit the manufacture of amphetamines.

In our opinion, limitation on these and other such widely abused drugs should be written into law. Perhaps not, they will be. The United States, and 63 other nations, have just signed a treaty, whereby each agrees to establish drug quotas as well as licensing and reporting devices. The Congress should move quickly to ratify the treaty and work out details of the necessary legislation.

The profits of drug companies—even those who have been helpful in backing drug abuse legislation—cannot be measured against the damage done our young people by the appalling number of unnecessary drugs that this country manufactures.

REPEAL OF THE SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT

HON. BELLA S. ABZUG

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, March 3, 1971

Mrs. ABZUG. Mr. Speaker, yesterday I appeared before the House Armed Services Committee to present my views on the grave and critical question of the draft. I indicated there my profound conviction that all forms of military conscription must be dismantled, and that any proposal which calls for less than that—to reform the draft rather than to abolish it—is a snare and a fraud upon the public.

Our country can no longer ignore the injustices and immorality of a system that takes men against their will and then compounds the injustice by favoring the privileged and the affluent. Nor can we continue to supply unlimited manpower to Indochina and thus enable the prolongation of a generals' war in Southeast Asia. In my testimony I expressed support for Senate Joint Resolution 20, a resolution sponsored by Senators HATFIELD, MCGOVERN, CHURCH, and CRANSTON, which calls for repeal of the Military Selective Service Act by December 31, 1971. I have introduced a similar resolution, House Joint Resolution 345, in the House.

The text of House Joint Resolution 345 and of my testimony before the Armed Services Committee follow:

H.J. Res. 345

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Military Selective Service Act of 1964, as amended, is repealed effective December 31, 1971.

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE BELLA S. ABZUG BEFORE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for the opportunity to present my views on the draft to the House Armed Services Committee as you receive testimony on House bills 2476, 3496, 3497 and 3498.

Let me quickly summarize views that I will expand upon in a moment. I am unalterably opposed to military conscription and believe it should be dismantled. I regard draft reform as a snare and delusion. Changes in a system of involuntary servitude can never correct the basic injustice perpetrated by a form of slavery. Moreover, the

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draft has made possible the escalation and continuation of the war in Indochina. As an important step toward ending that wretched war, the President's power to induct men into the armed forces must not be extended beyond June 30.

The draft has brought untold misery to many of my constituents, the less privileged members of society, including a high percentage of Puerto Ricans, who suffer most from the injustices of conscription. I should like to speak of their condition, and also emphasize the deep and passionate concern that most women feel about the draft.

In the first place, I view any form of compulsory "service" as wrong and, in fact, a misuse of the word service. Conscription, no matter how worthy the avowed purpose, no matter in what sophisticated packaging it is wrapped, is involuntary servitude. To keep using the word "service" to describe actual slavery is a mockery.

Therefore, I do not advocate any type of draft reform. I view attempts to make the draft allegedly more equitable as both romantic and pernicious—romantic because the achievement of equity within a conscription system is impossible, and pernicious since by instituting minor changes and holding out false hopes these attempts tend to make the draft more palatable to the public.

Even such widely heralded "reform" as the lottery has not for one minute altered the fact that some men are taken, and that among them some are killed, wounded and mutilated, while others remain free to go about their business because they drew a lucky number.

I share with millions of my fellow Americans deep distress at the strife and discord that the draft is producing so widely throughout our country. Until very recently the draft was conscripting thousands of young men, too young to vote. The draft is still exploiting the labor of all young men, especially those who are politically and economically least powerful. Many of my constituents are in this group. Large numbers of the young people in my district are poor, and many are Puerto Rican or black and jobless. Students are deferred. Those in essential occupations are deferred. My constituents, not deferred, are drafted in their stead.

I have witnessed at first hand the increasing alienation of many young people as conscription forces them to choose among evils—either going to Vietnam to fight in a war they loathe, fleeing the country, or going to jail.

In my district the revulsion against military conscription is considerable, and in the course of my election campaign it was made clear to me that the people there want an end to the draft, an end to the war and attention to their very pressing needs for better housing, jobs, etc.

Such measures as the abolition of student deferments and the setting of a national call are not sufficient to deal with the injustice of conscription. If student deferments are ended, some of my constituents will be drafted, sent to foreign battlefields to kill and to be killed, while other young men will remain scot free. As long as one American boy is forced against his will both to face death and to mete it out to others, then basic injustice and the cruelest form of slavery continue to operate in our society.

Secondly, I object to any and all draft laws because of the practical impact that peace time conscription has had upon U.S. foreign policy. The draft has greatly weakened democratic control over foreign policy. It has provided the manpower for large-scale military interventions overseas without approval by Congress and the people. The existence of an unlimited supply of conscripts encourages the government to resort to military solutions and thwarts the development of a constructive foreign policy. The Vietnam

war might have been avoided had Congress been required to approve a reinstatement of the draft for specific purpose of furnishing fighting men for Vietnam instead of being called on to approve an ambiguous and relatively harmless looking Gulf of Tonkin resolution.

Conscription thus becomes the key element in enabling administrations, whether Democrat or Republican, unilaterally to commit the nation to war, even when that involvement proves to be dangerous to the national interest and the health of the economy.

Conscription guarantees to the military and to the White House the "flexibility" which by their own admission they covet. Ready access to a limitless reservoir of manpower enables them rapidly to expand the size of the army by administrative fiat and thus to wage undeclared war. There is no need to consult Congress, no need to go to the people.

The key role which the draft plays in making possible the continuation of the immoral and unpopular war in Indochina is underlined by the very introduction of H.R. 2476. The drafting of men, we are told, must continue for at least two more years. Testimony has been given to this Committee to prove that without a conscription system to furnish men to the armed forces, even the gradual withdrawal of American forces from Indochina cannot be implemented as presently planned. Selective Service Director, Curtis Tarr, recently visited Saigon for a firsthand view of the situation, and expressed the judgment that we must have the draft to continue fighting in Vietnam. Defense Department spokesmen testified recently that the draft must be continued for two years to meet the manpower needs of the armed forces, including the necessary deployment in Indochina.

According to figures given to me by the Defense Department, as of February 11, 1971 the Army alone was sending 19,000 replacements a month to Vietnam. The percentage of draftees who go to Vietnam is not recorded as they depart from the United States but approximately 37 percent of American troops in Vietnam are draftees and that percentage has remained steady for a number of months. Overall, 11 percent of Army personnel are draftees, so that apparently a disproportionate number of draftees is being sent to Vietnam.

The casualty figures are also illuminating. For the first quarter of 1970, for example, of those killed in action, 65 percent were drafted men. Of those wounded in action for the first seven months of 1970, 58% were draftees. For the total period from January, 1961 to March 31, 1970, 49.3% of those killed in action were draftees. The full meaning of this last figure becomes clear when it is noted that for a number of years as the war was winding up, no draftees were in Vietnam.

Clearly, without the forced involvement of conscripts, Administration and Defense Department plans for waging war in Southeast Asia would have to undergo considerable revision.

I believe that this abominable war must end. The majority of the American people have made it clear through public opinion polls that they want the war to end. Thus far, every effort to do so has failed. The Cooper-Church Amendment is being openly flouted. The war is not winding down; with the invasion of Laos, it is expanding. In the final analysis, manpower is warpower. Cutting off the manpower will necessitate a radical change in so-called withdrawal time-tables. Cutting off the manpower will ultimately result in ending the war.

I therefore strongly advocate ending the draft in order to end the war. I express my support for Senate Joint Resolution 20, sponsored by Senators Hatfield, McGovern, Church and Cranston, a resolution that would totally abolish the Selective Service

System by December 31st of this year. I have introduced a similar Resolution, H.R. 345, in the House.

As a minimum step, should Senate Joint Resolution 20 not be enacted by the U.S. Senate, I strongly advocate that the President's induction power not be extended beyond June 30, this year. Deep concern has been increasingly expressed in Congress because the control that it once exercised over foreign policy has virtually disappeared. If Congress wishes to reassert its influence over foreign policy, one practical step would be to close the door on the conscription of manpower at the behest of the President.

Moreover, I firmly believe that the time to put an end to the President's induction power is this year. To wait for such action until 1973—after the national elections—means in all probability never to take action. Today with the draft still conscripting young men to fight in Vietnam, feeling runs deep throughout the land. If, however, draft calls are gradually reduced to zero by 1973, that feeling will abate, and today's demands for an end to conscription will fade. In 1973, it will be easy quietly to extend the presidential induction power—perhaps indefinitely. That, I believe, is what the Pentagon and the Administration have been counting on all along. For the welfare of our country, for the preservation of genuine freedom in America, and for the peace of the world, we must not allow that to happen.

Coupled, of course, with the need for draftees to fill the ranks in Indochina is the manpower problem posed by the fact that approximately one million American men are posted in garrisons overseas. To man these far flung military outposts, we must conscript young men, at least so we are told. Clearly, to many of the world's peoples our overseas military bases—thousands of miles from our shores—often much closer to the borders of potential enemy nations than to our own, are highly provocative. Far from promoting peace, they create suspicion and hostility. Far from providing security, these bases make for fear and animosity. I urge that we bring the men home from these military outposts. As we do, our alleged need of conscription to provide manpower for these bases disappears.

Although not an advocate of a volunteer army, I recognize the fact that if the draft is repealed within the next few months, we will then have an army without draftees—obviously, an army of volunteers. I would make three comments about the existence of such armed forces:

First, a volunteer army is obviously a lesser evil than conscription. Secondly, such an army should not be a permanent feature of American life, but a transitional part of our society. I view the end of conscription and the resulting volunteer army, not as an end in itself, but as a step taken toward a world of law and order. To me the end of conscription, the resulting disappearance of a limitless source of manpower for military adventurism, and increased Congressional control over foreign policy would minimize the drives in some quarters for the U.S. to be a world policeman. The end of the draft would make far more likely the constructive participation of this great nation in building a world of genuine community. The causes of tension and mistrust would be greatly reduced if we adopted a far less threatening posture than that which we present to so much of mankind today.

In the third place, I support such pay raises as are included in H.R. 3496, 3497, and 3498, especially as they apply to first-term recruits. Draftees are presently grossly underpaid as compared to the wages they would receive in civilian life. One economist has estimated that, in effect, each draftee is "taxed" \$8600 per year in addition to having his body conscripted. To provide for pay raises as set forth in these bills is simply to approach



Stanley Karnow

Thais' Adroit Tactics

A KEY COUNTRY to watch in the expanding Indochina conflict is Thailand. For the Thais, with their traditional diplomatic skill, are currently engaged in adroit tactics that may prompt President Nixon to stretch the U.S. commitment in Southeast Asia even further than it has already gone.

If the President continues to rely heavily on air power as a substitute for American combat troops, as he is now doing, Thailand will be increasingly essential to his strategy as the site of a half-dozen bases that handle aircraft ranging from B-52s down to helicopters.

Knowing this, the Thais appear to be maneuvering to raise the price of their cooperation with the United States by making conciliatory gestures towards the Chinese and Vietnamese Communists.

Judging from present U.S. policy—one irreverent Washington official calls it "a widening down of the war"—the President may well feel compelled to reassure the Thais by undertaking moves that they regard as crucial to their security.

The Thais would be delighted to see a deeper U.S. involvement in Laos and Cambodia, the adjacent countries they consider to be vital to the defense of their borders.

They welcomed the American-backed South Vietnamese invasion of Laos, just as they welcomed U.S. intervention in Cambodia last year. And they would welcome the ouster of neutralist Prince Souvanna Phouma and the establishment of a conservative Laotian government, just as they welcomed Prince Sihanouk's replacement by a rightwing Cambodian regime.

Moreover, their concern with preventing the Communists from edging towards their frontiers is reflected in the fact that they have secretly been deploying artillery, communications and other specialized military units in Laos for years—and are doing so at the moment.

AT THE SAME time, however, the Thais have been counterpointing these attitudes and actions with measures apparently calculated to indicate that they are prepared to make deals with Peking and Hanoi as an alternative to the anti-Communist stance they have loudly publicized.

In a daring step not long ago, for example, they reopened talks with Hanoi over the repatriation of some 40,000 Vietnamese living in north-eastern Thailand. During these talks, Thai officials reportedly discussed their willingness to discuss broader questions of peace in the area.

According to reliable reports, the Thai Foreign Ministry is also examining the possibility of openly resuming trade with Communist China.

Another sign that the Thais are adopting a more flexible position has been mirrored of their treatment of former Premier Pridi Phanomyong, the liberal politician who used to be regularly denounced in Bangkok as a dangerous Communist conspirator.

One of the few Thais to fight against the Japanese in World War II, Pridi was overthrown in a coup d'etat nearly two decades ago and went into comfortable exile in Communist China. Last year, Peking quietly allowed him to leave China for Paris, where he now resides.

INSTEAD OF ASSAILING that move, as they would have done two years ago, the present Thai leaders have given Pridi his back pay, awarded him a pension and even provided him with a passport.

Pridi could be serving as a go-between with Peking and Hanoi. His "rehabilitation" indicates more clearly that the Thais are improving their links with the French after having attacked them for favoring a neutral Southeast Asia.

These and other Thai maneuvers, some as subtle as a Siamese dance, could be contrived to exert pressure on the Nixon administration to focus more attention on Thailand.

Were the President lowering rather than merely reshaping the U.S. profile in Asia, as his Guam Doctrine promised, he would be encouraging the Thais as well as America's South Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotian clients to seek an accommodation with the Communists.

But his present conduct in Indochina suggests that, like his predecessors, he is still striving for victory. Thus he may be tempted to reinforce, escalate an engagement that should have been liquidated long ago.

I believe it is important to America that the decline in this movement be reversed. I further believe this can only be done by basic changes in governmental policies that will restimulate the desire of our people to serve as representatives of American overseas or here at home. Without such rejuvenation of the desire to serve, the mere amalgamation of volunteer programs, which the President suggested in January, will probably be of little consequence.

With respect to the Peace Corps, this rejuvenation requires a foreign policy which ceases to be established primarily on cold war concepts and its replacement by a foreign policy that places our ideals above our fears, that seeks long-term peace rather than short-term tactical advantage, and that emphasizes what we as Americans stand for as well as what we stand against. On the domestic side, this rejuvenation needs a recommitment to a meaningful attack on poverty in the United States, to the saving of our environment, and to the overcoming of the morass of problems that consume our urban areas. Only with basic changes such as these can a climate be restored in which the people of this country truly want to serve.

Thus, on this the 10th anniversary of the Peace Corps, I congratulate all those who have answered the call to service—in the Peace Corps and in the host of other private and public volunteer organizations; and I urge that we as a nation commit ourselves to rekindle the Peace Corps spirit, so that Americans will continue to have not only the vehicles through which to serve their fellow men but also the desire to do so.

CAPTIVE NATIONS

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I know that my colleagues share with me the deep concern for those in central and Eastern Europe who live under regimes which do not represent their ideals or their aspirations. It is one of the tragedies of our time that such situations exist year after year without hope of immediate change. It is very sad that the United Nations is not a protagonist for change.

On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the United Nations, Vasil Germenji, chairman of the Assembly of Captive European Nations, sent the following telegram to Dr. Edward I. Hambro, president of the United Nations General Assembly:

The Assembly of Captive European Nations, composed of democratic representatives of the silenced people of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Rumania, extends to Your Excellency and the General Assembly its sincere congratulations on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations.

The United Nations, founded amid great hopes for a just and lasting peace, is entering a crucial stage of its existence. In spite of many notable accomplishments, the U.S. has unfortunately failed to address itself to a number of deep-seated problems plaguing mankind. Our Assembly respectfully draws

the attention of Your Excellency and that of the General Assembly to the following:

1. Not one of the nine countries listed above is represented in the United Nations by delegates designated by a freely elected government. These delegates have no right to speak on behalf of our nations. They speak in behalf of regimes which have been imposed on these countries by, or with direct assistance of, a foreign power, and which have maintained their stranglehold over East and Central Europe by force, intimidation and threats. In an age of world wide advocacy of the right to self-determination, this continued misrepresentation of 100 million East and Central Europeans in violation of the Charter of the United Nations should be condemned, and corrective measures instituted.

2. Since the nine nations enjoy no genuine representation in the U.N., their citizens have no recourse for airing their grievances concerning violation of human rights and political freedoms and seeking redress. It is submitted that the U.N. should devise, and make operative, a machinery that would allow nationals of these countries to take specific steps to bring their case to the attention of the world forum.

3. The implications of the Brezhnev Doctrine of Limited Sovereignty—formulated after the invasion of Czechoslovakia—are in direct contravention to the principles of the U.N. Charter, which postulates that each member state is to enjoy full sovereignty. It is inconceivable how a member state—the Soviet Union—can enunciate a Doctrine so fundamentally opposed to the letter and spirit of the U.N. Charter, without being brought to account by the members of the United Nations.

The U.N.'s prestige can be enhanced only if the organization consistently and without exception defends and adheres to the provision of its Charter and the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man.

A case in point is the situation in the Captive European Nations and specifically the unresolved question of Hungary.

The Assembly of Captive European Nations respectfully submits to Your Excellency and to the General Assembly that the time to act on pressing issues including those outlined above so essential to international peace and security, is now—on this solemn occasion when the U.N. observes twenty-five years of its existence.

The sentiments expressed in Mr. Germenji's telegram are in keeping with the feelings of a great majority of Americans who want freedom and autonomy for the peoples of central and Eastern Europe. His comments about the so-called Brezhnev doctrine are especially compelling and deserve the attention of all in this body. I commend them to you.

THE WIDENING WAR IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, on February 16, 1971, the CBS television network presented a new special entitled "The Changing War in Indochina: The Widening War in Laos and Cambodia." This program was one of the most comprehensive and objective accounts of the war in Indochina that the media has produced.

I ask unanimous consent that the transcript of the program be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the transcript was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE CHANGING WAR IN INDOCHINA: THE WIDENING WAR IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA
AS BROADCAST OVER THE CBS TELEVISION NETWORK, FEB. 16, 1971, WITH CBS NEWS CHIEF FOREIGN CORRESPONDENT CHARLES COLLINGWOOD

Produced by CBS News

CHARLES COLLINGWOOD. This scene is as familiar as the story of America's involvement in Vietnam: Massed U.S. units on the move. But this may be the final big-scale American action in South Vietnam—and on the ground, it is strictly limited. The orders are to go up to the border with Laos and no farther. It is the South Vietnamese who are going across.

The war in Indochina is changing, radically and rapidly. The American combat role on the ground is diminishing. The South Vietnamese are taking over. But in the air the American combat role continues. There are as yet no boundaries to the exercise of American air power and as the geography of the war expands, the great weight of our air strikes has switched from South Vietnam to Laos and Cambodia.

There is a paradox about this new war on new battlefields at the very moment the United States is winding down its participation in Vietnam. Administration officials deny that the invasion of Laos represents an extension of the war.

Secretary of Defense Laird. No, the area of the war is being narrowed because the war has moved out of South Vietnam to a large extent, it's moved out of North Vietnam and now the war has narrowed into the area of the occupied territory of Cambodia—north-eastern Cambodia and in southern Laos. So, by any measurement, the war is being narrowed as far as its scope is concerned.

Collingwood. Critics insist that by any measurement the war is obviously being widened.

MARVIN KALB. Senator, the Administration claims that its actions in Cambodia and Laos have really not widened the war and, in fact, have hastened the timetable for the U.S. withdrawal.

Senator FRANK CHURCH. Have we widened the war?

KALB. Have not widened the war.
CHURCH. Opening a front in Laos? It doesn't widen the war?

KALB. Well, that's what they claim. Now what is your own feeling?

CHURCH. Black is white? Night is day? Up is down? Doesn't the language mean anything any more? Of course the war has been widened, in the sense that the fighting now is going on in Laos, and it's going on in Cambodia, and American forces are participating on fronts that didn't exist before.

Collingwood. The U.S., and more particularly the South Vietnamese, are now participating on fronts that did not exist before. To a degree, the fate of South Vietnam is now being decided in the jungles of Laos and Cambodia. Yet Secretary Laird is also right. The war is narrowing—at least in the American commitment of lives, of money, of troops on station.

These contradictory changes, these transformations of the last year in Indochina, and their implications are the subjects of our broadcast tonight. I'm Charles Collingwood.

ANNOUNCER. This is a CBS News Special Report, the first of two broadcasts on "The Changing War in Indochina." Tonight: "The Widening War in Laos and Cambodia." With CBS News Chief Foreign Correspondent Charles Collingwood.
(Announcement.)

Collingwood. South Vietnamese troops are now well into their second week in Laos, with American planes supporting them overhead and 9,000 American troops backing them

up across the border in South Vietnam, but no American soldiers fighting with them. The operation was born under a news embargo and has been scant on information ever since, but the South Vietnamese Command says the advance has already been consolidated along the axis of Route 9 to a point about halfway between the border and the town of Tchepone, a key point on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Reconnaissance troops are said to have reached Tchepone itself.

According to Saigon, about one-half of the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex in this area has already been blocked. This, of course, is the purpose of the operation, to cut the supply line from North Vietnam down into South Vietnam and into Cambodia. The enemy is believed to have been making a special effort this year to push his men and supplies down the Trail, but because of bad weather at the beginning of dry season, the progress is thought to have been delayed and supplies piled up in the northern part of the Trail. Therefore, it is reasoned, if the Trail is cut now, North Vietnamese offensive operations would be prevented this dry season and possibly next. That is the rationale of the present attack in Laos, but expectations in Indochina have a habit of being denied. The name of this operation is Lam Son 719, the 719th in a series of South Vietnamese Army operations. There is no reason as yet to think there will not be a 720th or 30th or—that is to say, there is no reason to believe that the invasion of Laos will in itself end the war. At most it is a way station on the road toward American departure and South Vietnamese self-sufficiency.

Although the Army of South Vietnam is bearing the brunt of the fighting in Laos, the way for the offensive was prepared by Americans. Don Webster reports.

WEBSTER. When the offensive began January 30th, the first vehicles to move were American. They pushed westward down Highway 9, a road which runs all the way from the South China Sea across Vietnam and then across Laos.

The decision to reopen Highway 9 and the bases which are strung out along it created a virtual traffic jam of vehicles. In the air, helicopters of all varieties were used to ferry troops and supplies to key locations. This tremendous activity in an area which had been deserted couldn't be concealed. In this important way it differed from the Cambodian operations of last summer, which took place with little visible evidence of advance preparations. Despite attempts by the military to place a news embargo on the preparations for Laos, there was worldwide speculation about it ten days before it even began.

One by one, American troops reopened their old bases, Camp Carroll, Vandergrift, Khesanh, Lang Vei—and many small bases which don't even have names. This one at Lang Vei had a special significance: it is the only outpost in this war which Americans have had to abandon, on the run, under enemy fire. Three years ago Communist troops overran it, using tanks, in a middle-of-the-night attack.

As to the G.I.'s, at a glance they appear much the same as before, loaded with goods they will need in the field. But the tactics being used by American troops are different. Basically, they went to their locations and stayed there. They are not holding night ambushes. They are not holding combat assaults. There are not very many reconnaissance patrols. That is now the job of the ARVN.

KONYHA. Really, we're simply mainly for forming a blocking force function. Road clearing and things like this in support of the Vietnamese operation.

WEBSTER. Would you like to go with them into Laos?

G.I. Definitely not! From what—we don't

know anything about it, but from what everybody says, it's—you know—it's pretty hairy over there. So, I don't think so. I think, as I just said, I imagine I'm just like the rest of the guys and want to go home.

WEBSTER. How long do you think you'll be out here?

G.I. Well, when we left our area, why, they told us that we'd be up here about thirty days. And I don't know if that's for sure or not.

WEBSTER. Will you be glad to get back? G.I. Yeah. I'd be glad to get back where I came from.

WEBSTER. Besides all the logistical help and the artillery, the other major U.S. role has been in the air, for transport of Vietnamese troops into Laos and the use of American helicopters and gunships in Laos. It is in this area the Vietnamese need the most help. President Thieu, when he visited the Laos Command Center in Vietnam the other day, was well aware of this.

Do you think in the future you could continue to conduct operations in Laos like this without American air support?

THIEU. I think that we still need American air support, as a very frank . . .

WEBSTER. For years to come?

THIEU. It depends upon how our aviation will be developed. That's a very important factor.

WEBSTER. Do you think that in the future, in years to come, South Vietnamese troops are going to have to continue to go back into Laos again and again as you are in Cambodia?

THIEU. We cannot say what we will do one year ahead. Now, we can say only what I have said, it's a very limited operation—limited in time, in space and the duration and every year. Now it depends upon how the war is going on and we will decide later on.

WEBSTER. It's been a good many years since the U.S. sat back and let someone else do the bulk of the fighting, in Vietnam or anywhere else. But with American offensive operations due to end in Vietnam by May First, this may be a preview of the way the U.S. will operate here in the future. Don Webster, CBS News, in Quang Tri, South Vietnam.

COLLINGWOOD. Although the ground operations in Laos are South Vietnamese, the Americans in their secondary role have taken substantial casualties. The Pentagon reports 19 Americans have been killed in "air operations." Earlier, ten Americans had been reported killed in "Operations Dewey Canyon." Fifteen U.S. helicopters have officially been listed as destroyed, and many more are believed to have been shot down but later recovered.

Casualties among the South Vietnamese are higher—71 reported killed. And they claim to have killed nearly five hundred of the enemy. Nevertheless, North Vietnamese resistance so far has been less vigorous than expected, as the South Vietnamese move ahead slowly and cautiously. Jeff Williams reports from Laos.

WILLIAMS. The South Vietnamese thrust into Laos is proceeding at a snail's pace, and these airborne forces appear to be in no real hurry. They know they will be in Laos for a long time.

While one thrust toward the Ho Chi Minh Trail was made on the ground, Ranger and airborne units were helicoptered directly into the conflict, in U.S. Army choppers. Although the United States Government says it is not sending Americans on the ground into Laos, U.S. troops are playing a major air support role. The overwhelming majority of all Vietnamese troops carried into combat go on U.S. helicopters, as do the tons of supplies they need.

Troops pushing across the dry Laotian hills are slowly but steadily uncovering enemy supply caches, like here right in the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex. The goods are stored in these bunkers for short periods, then carried

on south into Cambodia or east into South Vietnam.

What type of supplies did you find?

South Vietnamese Officer. Every kind. Ammo, rice . . . medical—every kind. And many—many (indistinct) material.

WILLIAMS. This part of the Trail is quite elaborate. It includes bamboo trellises over exposed parts of the road to hide it from planes. Gasoline drums were left behind as the Hanoi regulars fled the base camp. The Vietnamese troops hope to find many such dumps, but they may be disappointed.

The Ho Chi Minh Trail is a pipeline for supplies, and as such, the goods are kept moving and are not stored in large amounts. The North Vietnamese, with more than a full combat division in the area, are fighting back from an elaborate network of bunkers along the Trail. And as the South Vietnamese push forward, the enemy resists more stubbornly. Casualties are increasing. Wounded men are flown out of combat areas by both American and Vietnamese choppers. But medical attention for the Vietnamese in the field is poor. Not a few soldiers bleed to death because the average soldier is not skilled in basic first aid.

Some causes for the slow progress of the incursion are the elaborate preparations by the Vietnamese, including a series of artillery bases like this. The Saigon troops are going in to stay, and they're using bulldozers to build lasting defensive positions. Here again, it's the U.S. bringing in the supplies. Technically, the South Vietnamese invasion into Laos is a limited operation. The purpose of this drive is to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail, but until that is completed, the South Vietnamese are not likely to leave. Jeff Williams, CBS News, on a firebase inside Laos.

COLLINGWOOD. If the South Vietnamese do contemplate staying indefinitely astride the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, they will face heavy risks from the weather and the enemy. When the rainy season begins in May, what is now dust along Route 9 will turn into mud, hampering ground movement; and in the air the sodden skies will limit American air support. Like the rains, the North Vietnamese are bound to come sometime, too. As they push farther into Laos, the South Vietnamese are bracing for enemy counterattacks. Already the North Vietnamese have intensified their pressure in the northern part of Laos, tightening their encirclement of the CIA-based camp at Long Cheng, less than 100 miles from the capital of Vientiane.

In Vientiane, the neutralist government of Souvanna Phouma issued only a token protest against the South Vietnamese entry, put the main blame on the North Vietnamese for being there in the first place. Souvanna told our correspondent, Ed Rabel, he did not feel that the U.S. has escalated the war and said he doubts that China will be drawn in.

(Announcement.)

COLLINGWOOD. If the current South Vietnamese ground operations in Laos are new, U.S. air operations over Laos are not. We have been bombing Pathet Lao forces in the North and the Ho Chi Minh Trail for at least five years, although President Nixon announced it officially only last March. In recent months the bulk of the missions have been against the movement of supplies.

From US airbases in South Vietnam and Thailand, and from aircraft carriers in the Tonkin Gulf, American fighter bombers flew almost 100,000 sorties against targets in Laos during 1970. They are going after crossroads, supply dumps, truck parks, and moving vehicles along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Some of the missions are flown by C-119 gunships, equipped with infra red and other devices to enable them to spot and strafe moving vehicles at night. From U Tapao, Thailand, B-52 bombers fly missions against the trail, averaging about 900 a month, almost the

entire number of B-52 missions the Air Force is permitted in South East Asia each month.

More than 400 planes have been shot down over Laos since we started bombing there, more than fifty in the last ten months, not counting the current ground combat support operations there. American pilots say the ground fire is heavy, accurate and increasing. Jed Duvall spoke with pilots just returned from a mission over Laos.

Captain EAST. I've been over here for a year now and it seems like recently they've been shooting at us more than ever before. They've gotten more guns in, of course they have a lot of ammo it seems, and every target we go in on, they're hammering away at us. And it's big stuff.

DUVALL. What do you mean, big stuff?

Captain EAST. It's just big stuff, it comes up as big red tracers at us and explodes just like it does in the movies, World War II, you know, you see the guns come up and the flak start, that's all it is, just flak, just like they had in World War II and the Korean War. It's bad stuff.

Lieutenant GROVES. Most of the time the guns that fire, the closer you get to the target, the more the guns will fire. If you're not closed they're not going to fire very much, but the closer you get to the trucks, they really open up.

DUVALL. Captain, what are your targets on the Trail, what are you trying to hit?

Captain LEMON. Well, the targets, mainly consist of movers, in other words, loaded trucks. And IDP's, or interdiction points, choke points where the roads will come together at one point and we try to crater these roads, to inhibit the flow of the traffic. And oftentimes, the forward air controllers in the area will find trucks that are actually moving on the Trail and we will also try to hit these. These are basically the two prime targets that we have on the Trail.

DUVALL. Do you get the idea that you're stopping some of the traffic or most of the traffic or what?

Captain EAST. We're stopping some of it. We're stopping some with our bombs, and we're stopping some with the threat of our bombs. The traffic doesn't move much in the daytime, very, very little. At night they do most of their moving and we stop a lot of it, but of course, not all of it. We're helping a great deal, in my opinion, but we're not stopping the flow completely.

DUVALL. Lieutenant, what does the Trail look like? Is it one straight road?

Lieutenant GROVES. Largely it's a honeycomb. There are places where there's not much jungle around it, but those places are pretty scarce. It runs a lot of times pretty close to a river, almost paralleling at times, but most of the rivers here are so crooked they can't do that very well. The triple-layered canopy is pretty bad. You can't see it in a lot of places, you have to have—

DUVALL. By triple-layered canopy, you mean heavy jungle?

Lieutenant GROVES. Yes, three different layers of jungle above it, different heights of trees and it grows in three layers. And you can see the trail in spots from the lighter color dirt road with the green background all around it, but to really get a good look at it you have to be a little slower than we are and a little lower.

Captain EAST. There's one thing I'd like to add. I don't think people realize about the Trail, is the fact that it is so large. Now, everybody thinks of it as maybe four or five roads coming right in to South Vietnam and that's not true at all. That thing is about fifty miles wide and two-three hundred miles long. And the whole thing is nothing but a network of roads, just everywhere. Now they're well travelled. There is traffic on them constantly. Every road it seems is travelled. If we should hit the road, which we try to do, with a bomb to stop the traffic, it's fixed within a period of just a matter of hours.

They have big bulldozers come in and clear the road and the traffic starts again.

COLLINGWOOD. American fighter-bombers, B-52s and helicopter gunships also fly strikes against targets in Cambodia, and in recent months, as the ground situation there has deteriorated, the number of fighter-bomber sorties has increased, about 1500 a month for the last few months compared with 500 a month earlier in 1970. It has been obvious to newsmen on the ground that some of them, at least, especially in the Route 4 operations, have been close air support for Cambodian and Vietnamese troops. During the heavy fighting last month to reopen that key road from Phnom Penh to the port of Kompong Som, Cambodian and South Vietnamese troops were getting American helicopter support from two carriers in the Gulf of Siam and from a helicopter base at Phu Quoc Island, just off Cambodia's southern coast.

We spoke to General Lucius D. Clay, Jr., commander of the 7th Air Force in Southeast Asia, about the changing air war in Indochina.

General CLAY. In the last several months that I've been here, we've seen a decided decline in the air operations in the Republic of Vietnam, as compared to what it might have been a year ago or the last time you made a survey of this nature.

On the other hand, with the importance of the logistic activities of the Viet Cong, particularly as they relate to the Ho Chi Minh Trail, we find our activities up there are just as busy as ever. So I guess in substance then, the answer is that in terms of close air support and direct support of the U.S. Army in the Republic of Vietnam, there has been a decline. But in terms of our other activities throughout Southeast Asia, we're still fighting a pretty busy war.

COLLINGWOOD. General Clay, how effective has been our bombing of the South—of the Ho Chi Minh Trail?

General CLAY. Well, I'd like to give you a good firm answer to that, Mr. Collingwood, but unfortunately, there is no firm answer. I happen to think that so far this year we've been more effective than ever. We've introduced some new equipment, particularly in the form of gunships, which have been highly effective. However, I think the full story remains to be told because as you well know we work over there most effectively during the dry season. This, of course, is the dry season now, and it will come to a close some time around May, the latter part of May 1971. And at that time, we'll have a story to put together as to just how effective it's been.

COLLINGWOOD. Do we contemplate training and equipping the South Vietnamese eventually to undertake the interdiction missions that we are now flying in Laos and Cambodia?

General CLAY. No, sir, we're not. Basically, the Vietnamese Air Force is being trained to handle the insurgency problem within the country, within the Republic of Vietnam. As you may know, the lighter aircraft we are leaving with the Vietnamese Air Force are basically A-1s and A-37s, basically short-range, close-support type airplanes. So we're not leaving heavy carriers of ordnance, long-range type airplanes, which are the kind necessary if you're going to be operating in trails of Laos and outside the Republic of Vietnam.

COLLINGWOOD. General Clay makes a point and poses a question. His point: The Vietnamese Air Force is being trained and left with strength to operate only within South Vietnam's boundaries. The question: If air operations outside continue to be necessary, who will conduct them, and how?

(Announcement.)

COLLINGWOOD. Whatever the South Vietnamese operations across the border may ultimately accomplish in Laos and Cambodia, they have certainly given Saigon's armed forces a psychological shot in the arm. They

have shown that they are not only vastly superior to the amateur armies of Cambodia and Laos but that in conventional warfare they are often more than a match for the North Vietnamese themselves. This has given them a new and heady self-confidence. I asked General Do Cao Tri, who commands the Vietnamese now in Cambodia, whether his operations were a strain on his troops and his resources.

General TRI. Not at all. On the contrary, it gives more opportunity to our regular army to be able to continue to impose our pressure to our enemy. Last year we stole them in their sanctuary and we forced them to withdraw far away from our border. And we continue to have our initiative of action in Cambodian territory and to keep such pressure on the enemy regular forces as long as we intend to stay in Cambodia.

COLLINGWOOD. Well, do you foresee that you'll be making a greater effort in Cambodia than in the future?

General TRI. I think so. And I'm quite optimistic about our military potential in Cambodia because the dry season comes now, and it's the most favorite time for our military operations. The terrain in Cambodia is favorable for the use of combined arms and we plan to employ our full firepower to destroy the enemy where they are.

COLLINGWOOD. The war in Indochina is changing; what are the principal changes that you have seen?

General TRI. From outside, the big change is that it's become, really, a Vietnamese war, in which South Vietnamese Army and the people are fighting against Communist aggression. There will be no more U.S. combat troops commitment in our fighting.

COLLINGWOOD. General Tri, do you think that you'll ever see in your military region a resumption of the big war, main force elements making another threat to Saigon?

General TRI. Never it will happen, because I keep the enemy main forces away now from our border. How can they come back again once they have to fight against us where they are?

COLLINGWOOD. You mean you keep them in Cambodia?

General TRI. Quite sure.

COLLINGWOOD. In any discussion of the widening war in Indochina, Laos and Cambodia are now run together almost as one word. They're very different countries with different problems, but it was a similar military logic which converted them into battlefields.

At the beginning, the Cambodian operation was oversold as a brief surgical stroke which would solve the problem of the sanctuaries once and for all. Well, nine months later it's still going on. The South Vietnamese are back in Cambodia, scouring the sanctuaries and keeping roads open. They are actually more deeply involved in Cambodia today than they are in Laos. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the Cambodian incursion did greatly relieve the military pressure on the southern part of South Vietnam, permitting dramatic progress in extending government control. It is hoped that Laos operation will do the same thing for the central and northern provinces. But whatever its salutary effects in South Vietnam, the widening of the war has made a shambles of Cambodia.

The most important thing about Cambodia is that it has survived. In 11 months now since the overthrow of Sihanouk brought the war to what was surely one of the most unprepared countries on earth. But with American and South Vietnamese help, the Government of Lon Nol, however precariously, stayed in power under increasing enemy pressure. And there is no reason to think, even in the light of his illness and replacement by Sirik Matak, that his government will fall now. But the price of survival has been heavy.

Phnom Penh, once the most agreeable of

March 1, 1971

Southeast Asia capitals, now bears all the familiar signs of a city under siege. Sandbags and barbed wire abound. Patriotic slogans are flaunted to catch the eye and charge the spirit. There is a prevalence of uniforms, not only for those actually in the Army, but for civilians as well, to whom even a quasi-uniform is worn as a sign of solidarity in the struggle against the enemy.

If the fate of a peaceful people were not at stake, some of the preparations for the defense of the fatherland would be touchingly funny. As it is, there is a certain air of hasty improvisation about Cambodia's defense preparations. The roadblocks that ring the capital are even less effective than they look. The Communists showed how easily they could penetrate Phnom Penh's defense perimeter by their devastating raid on the capital's airport in which they blew up most of Cambodia's fledgling air force and got away scot free. They also hit brutally at a barracks compound.

These, and similar acts of terrorism are reminiscent of the way the Viet Cong was operating in Vietnam in the early 1960's. I asked the U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia, Emory Swank, about that.

SWANK. I'm not familiar with all of the situation in Vietnam in the early '60's, but I can think off-hand of a very important difference, and that is that this country really is not in a state of civil war. This is outside aggression, unmistakably, from North Vietnam and from the Viet Cong.

COLLINGWOOD. Are the people of Cambodia behind the present government?

SWANK. My impression, certainly, from the time that I've been here, since last September, is that the government enjoys the support of most of the important element of the urban population. Quite frankly, concerning the countryside, the returns are inconclusive, and I don't think we have enough information to make a valid judgment.

COLLINGWOOD. How do you foresee the enemy's intentions toward Cambodia? Do they want to take over the country?

SWANK. This is, of course, a very interesting and difficult question to answer, because we can't probe the enemy's thinking, completely. But my own personal judgment is that the enemy's principal object of interest remains South Vietnam, and that Laos and Cambodia are both way stations along that road.

COLLINGWOOD. Were the present government in Cambodia to be seriously threatened, could the United States really just stand idly by?

SWANK. This is a bridge that I would rather not cross right now, Mr. Collingwood.

COLLINGWOOD. One of the ways in which the enemy can easily produce a critical situation in Cambodia is to cut the main arteries linking Phnom Penh with the rest of the country. A regular object of his attention is Route 4, which connects Phnom Penh with its seaport of Kompong Som. Last month the enemy closed the highway and it took the Cambodians, plus a large South Vietnamese task force, plus powerful U.S. air support, to open it again.

Th Cambodians aren't cowards. They fight and they take casualties, but compared to the South Vietnamese, let alone the veterans from North Vietnam, they are not impressive soldiers and they are having to learn the hard way. While they are learning, Cambodia is clearly vulnerable to a major North Vietnamese attack with all the repercussions that would have on the situation in South Vietnam. I asked Fred Ladd, the U.S. official charged with guiding the Cambodian Army, how the enemy with only 6,000 effective fighting troops could blow up the airfield, close the roads and rivers, and what would happen if he poured more troops in?

LADD. Well, I think if he were to commit more troops at that kind of an objective, the airfield, or a road, or the river, it would be

easier for the Cambodians and their Vietnamese allies to deal him rather severe blows. And I feel that his strategy is to do these attacks rather spectacularly, but do them with very few people, and cause a sensational environment, when really the military situation as such is not that critical.

COLLINGWOOD. To what degree has the Cambodian Army improved?

LADD. Well, I think it's—I'm glad you asked. It's one of those points that isn't brought forward very often. They started in June or July with about 30,000-40,000 men in the army. This army was a rather makeshift affair, poorly led. It wasn't a very inspired group of people. And in the eight to nine months that have passed since then, the army has grown to about the strength of 200,000. So I think that, although it's still an amateur army, it gets better every day, and it isn't evident unless you sit and watch it over a period of months. But I do think they're much more effective today than they were in May.

COLLINGWOOD. If the enemy did mount a major attack against Cambodia, would the United States, in its own interest, be able to just let it collapse?

LADD. I really don't know, because I assume, and I have—the guidance I have received is that we would like a non-Communist government maintained in Cambodia. And it would depend on when it would be, I think. If it were right now, no. They want the Vietnamization program and the troop withdrawal—the United States does, in its interests, to continue. And if Cambodia were were to fall today, I think that this would seriously jeopardize both the troop withdrawals and the Vietnamization program.

COLLINGWOOD. The goal is for Cambodia eventually to be able to defend itself by itself, a Cambodianization program, if you will. To that end, thousands of Cambodians are being trained in South Vietnam. Don Webster reports.

WEBSTER. The program began last July, if not secretly, at least very quietly. It's estimated 16,000 Cambodians will be trained here this year. In the midst of a war which is winding down, this program is escalating rapidly. The Cooper-Church amendment prohibits any American ground troops or advisers in Cambodia, but it doesn't prevent Americans from advising the Cambodians by bringing them across the border. However, the Americans here deny that's happening. They say they are merely advising the Vietnamese, who in turn are instructing the Cambodians.

Vietnamese instructors here work through interpreters to get their points across. Some of the Cambodian pupils are just 15 years old. Presumably, the young Cambodians are learning more about Vietnam than just a few words . . . "mot hal, sat sat" . . . "one, two; kill, kill."

There's plenty of discussion whether the Vietnamese Army is ready to fight alone, but there seems general agreement the Cambodian Army is not ready.

How much longer do you think Cambodian troops will come to Vietnam for training?

Major SALAT. I think it will be one or two years more, sir.

WEBSTER. How long do you think it will take the Cambodian Army to become as good as the South Vietnamese is now?

Colonel BETTS. Well, by making a comparison with the Vietnamese Army, I would say in the neighborhood of eight to ten years.

COLLINGWOOD. Despite all the multinational efforts to train and equip the Cambodian forces, one thing is perfectly clear—Cambodia cannot yet survive without somebody's help. Right now it is militarily dependent upon South Vietnam. There are more South Vietnamese troops fighting in Cambodia now than there are in Laos—16,000 going over the old sanctuary areas of the Parrot's Beak and the Fishhook. The

South Vietnamese Economic Minister is budgeting for a constant level of 20,000 troops operating across the border in Cambodia. The Cambodians wish it were otherwise. They have an ancient antipathy for the Vietnamese, North and South alike, but they are willing to take help where they can get it now and are surprisingly confident that they will be able to hold off the North Vietnamese and still retain their independence and identity.

I asked Um Sim, Cambodia's Minister of Communications, if the enemy had any success recruiting the people to their side.

UM SIM. It all depends upon the definition of the word "success." I think to a certain extent they succeed in recruiting some of the Cambodian people. But this most mainly is done by force, not by persuasion or any other peaceful means.

COLLINGWOOD. Mr. Minister, is Cambodia receiving the amount and degree of assistance from the United States that is necessary to permit it to continue the fight on its own?

UM SIM. I think the American government has helped Cambodia to survive by moving into the sanctuary of the Viet Cong, North Vietnamese and by clearing up all the area. And later we have got some aid, but usually the aid has not come as fast as the situation was getting—you know, worse.

COLLINGWOOD. Mr. Minister, do you foresee any circumstances in which Cambodia might ask the United States once again to introduce ground forces into the war here?

UM SIM. This I am positively sure that the Cambodian government never asked for, the ground troops from the United States to help in fighting this war. I'm positively sure.

COLLINGWOOD. Do you hope that the South Vietnamese military operations in Cambodia would be able to be decreased in the future rather than increased?

UM SIM. I do hope so, because as the number of our well-trained troops is increasing, we will do our best in order to replace the South Vietnamese troops in here. And both parties agree to do so, because the presence of South Vietnamese troops in Cambodia is not doing any good to our policy.

COLLINGWOOD. Before illness struck him down last week, Cambodia's Prime Minister, General Lon Nol, was supremely optimistic. Many Americans thought too much so. He even dismissed the blow at Phnom Penh's airport as a mere incident and a sign of the enemy's desperation. What he wanted most was more American aid and equipment before his countrymen face the full brunt of a North Vietnamese attack.

Lon Nol (through interpreter). I have requested that delivery should be speeded up in the program. As for the aid covered by the program, we are holding meetings with our American friends in order to formulate an effective program with regard to both planning and execution. We hope that this will be done quickly.

COLLINGWOOD. What do you think of the enemy's intentions?

Lon Nol. I think the intention for the long run is as follows: The enemy, being unable to go straight into South Vietnam and also because they now lack bases and sanctuaries, is directing the whole effort against us—the whole effort.

COLLINGWOOD. General, is there anything that you would like to say to the American people?

Lon Nol. It gives us great moral encouragement to know that in the United States of America the people are learning to understand our problems more and more.

(Announcement).

COLLINGWOOD. It must have come as a relief to the Administration, if not a surprise, that the invasion of Laos did not provoke the same public outcries and disturbances which followed last year's entry into Cambodia. The cynical say it's because the pub-

lic—even the young—have become so numb about Indochina they won't get exercised unless American ground troops are directly engaged. Anyway, the kids stayed in school this time and the protests have been muted.

Nevertheless, what is happening in Laos is, in a real sense, only an extension of what already happened in Cambodia—minus Americans on the ground. The same basic arguments pertain, for and against, and the same arguments are being made. In Washington, Bob Schieffer spoke to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, and Marvin Kalb talked with Senator Frank Church, still a strong Administration critic.

KALB. Senator, it's claimed by the Administration that the war has been fought in this part of Laos for five years now, so it really hasn't been widened, and that's what they're saying.

CHURCH. It hasn't been fought with American helicopters in close tactical support, hovering above the tree-tops and firing into any enemy target of opportunity. It hasn't been fought in the middle of Cambodia and the western reaches of Cambodia. No, of course the war has been widened. Why fool the people?

KALB. Senator, why do you feel that there has been so little public outcry? There was public outrage last year at the time of Cambodia.

CHURCH. Because now we don't have an American army on the ground. We don't have thousands of American troops moving in on the ground to engage the enemy in hand-to-hand combat. And I'm glad that we were able to enact the Cooper-Church Amendment, which restricts the introduction of American ground forces in Laos and Cambodia. Otherwise, I think we'd have an American army in there, just as we had an American army in Cambodia eight or nine months ago.

KALB. Is the difference in climate, in your judgment, limited solely to that one reason, that there is not an American army in Laos?

CHURCH. No. The difference in climate is partly due to the fact that this is just more bombing. And the country has long since become accustomed to the bombing. It's been one of the brutalizing effects of this war.

But there's another reason for the change of climate. The President seems to be saying that he's winding down the war and he has withdrawn substantial numbers of American troops. I give him credit for that. I don't think that in that sense, his Vietnamization program is a token program. If he continues his present pace, if this is all the faster he feels he can go, I'd be willing to settle for that, as long as I knew that we're going to continue to come out . . . That we're not going to stop in May or August or in December of this year, and leave a large American military force in Vietnam indefinitely.

KALB. Come out lock, stock and barrel?

CHURCH. Come out. The time has come. We've equipped the Vietnamese, they have the capability. After all, we didn't promise to make that country the 51st American state, or use American men indefinitely to defend a government that South Vietnamese men should be willing to defend. And now that they have the capability the overriding objective in American policy should be to come out.

KALB. Senator, have you heard about any time limit on the use of American air power in support of South Vietnamese units in Cambodia or Laos?

CHURCH. No. No time limit at all. This is part of the reason why long-time critics of the war grow cynical when they hear about Vietnamization. They're fearful that rather than bringing us out of the war, it's just a method for changing our method of warfare, for converting our participation from ground warfare to air warfare, logistical support and artillery support, and that this is just going to go on endlessly.

There's going to come a time at the end of the summer, or the fall of this year, when the President will have to face his moment of truth on Vietnamization, when he's going to have to take his chances with the Vietnamese being able to do their job in their country . . . when he's going to have to turn back the risk of the war, and the eventual outcome of the war, to them.

SCHIEFFER. When the United States moved into Cambodia, there was a great public outcry. And yet when the details of this operation into Laos became known there was not really very much public criticism. Why do you suppose that is?

LAIRD. Because the South Vietnamese are handling this operation themselves as far as the ground combat is concerned, not only in the Cambodian situation but also in Laos. If there's been any escalation in this war, it's been the escalation in South Vietnam, giving South Vietnam a capability to defend itself and to carry on these combat responsibilities.

SCHIEFFER. But the fact is that U.S. helicopters are going in there, ferrying the troops directly into battle, as it were. They're landing, they're on the ground. Is that cutting the line a little bit thin, by using this air power for this close troop-lift as it's being used?

LAIRD. Air support has not been prohibited by the Congress. This was discussed at some length, but air support is perfectly within the letter of the law as well as the intent of Congress.

SCHIEFFER. The question I think that many critics are asking is this: How do you shorten the war by widening it? Is that a fair question?

LAIRD. Well, the important thing here is to disrupt the supply routes that are going to Cambodia and into South Vietnam from the Cambodian sanctuaries. By any kind of criteria you want to use on the success of this operation, even if we were to withdraw air support and the South Vietnamese were to leave Laos at the present time, this operation is to disrupt the logistic supply route so that we can reduce American casualties as we withdraw American troops. We will be withdrawing additional thousands of Americans, as a matter of fact while these operations are going on.

SCHIEFFER. Mr. Secretary, there will be another dry season next year, just like there's one this year. Will that require another South Vietnamese operation into Laos to interdict supplies?

LAIRD. Well, that would be a matter that would certainly be up to the South Vietnamese. I would—to be very frank with you they will even have a greater capability to carry on those kind of operations next year than they have this year.

SCHIEFFER. As I understand it there's no plan now to train or equip the South Vietnamese to handle this bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos once the United States stops that. What do you do about that? Does the United States just stay there? Will we be required to stay there and bomb as long as the North Vietnamese send supplies—

LAIRD. I don't know whose plans you're looking at. Our plans do give them very important gunship capability which is needed and necessary to interdict supplies and logistics on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. I don't know where you got your information that they weren't being prepared in this area, but we are turning over the gunships, we also are using the A-1s and other types of aircraft that can carry on a very effective interdiction campaign as far as the South Vietnamese are concerned.

SCHIEFFER. You're telling me that that plan is already underway?

LAIRD. The plan is underway to give the South Vietnamese Air Force an interdiction capability.

(Announcement).

COLLINGWOOD. Today Secretary Laird told the President the Laos operation is "going well." But even if it is a military success this time, it may have started something we are not prepared to finish. A precedent has now been established which would allow the South Vietnamese to push beyond their borders whenever necessary to keep the enemy off balance. But will they be capable of doing so, even if it were desirable?

This time, the massive operation was heavily dependent on U.S. air. Secretary Laird indicates that, in the future, South Vietnam will be able to furnish its own air support. But his air commander for Indochina, General Clay, indicated we are not leaving them that kind of force.

Three hundred U.S. helicopters, just for starters, are being used for the Laos attack. The entire projected South Vietnamese helicopter fleet is five hundred. And they will have little, if any, long-range fighter or bomber capability.

So, we may have solved a problem for this dry season—but what about the next, and the ones after that, as long as the North Vietnamese keep coming down the Ho Chi Minh Trail?

To fly cover for future adventures across the border, will we have to leave the South Vietnamese a far bigger and colder air force, and one which will take us far longer to train? Or will we keep the U.S. air strength there longer, and will the rate of its withdrawal be slower rather than faster from now on? And, if so, will the muted reaction of the American public to this geographical extension of the war remain that way?

Like all operations designed to buy time, the success of the ones in Laos and Cambodia will ultimately depend on how the time bought is used. And that means within South Vietnam. What is happening there is the second part of our report. Next Sunday at this same time I'll report on the situation in South Vietnam today—military, economic, political.

This is Charles Collingwood. Good night. (Announcement).

ANNOUNCER. This has been CBS NEWS SPECIAL REPORT, "The Widening War in Laos and Cambodia," the first of two broadcasts on "The Changing War in Indochina."

PROPOSED CUTS—ADMINISTRATION ON AGING FUNDS

Mr. PROUTY. Mr. President, it is with considerable regret that I take note of proposed reductions of more than \$7 million in the 1971-72 budget for the Administration on Aging in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

It is my understanding that cuts in funding for community grants under title III of the Older Americans Act and Foster Grandparents program by the Bureau of the Budget were contrary to recommendations from HEW Secretary Elliott Richardson.

The needs of older Americans, and hopes created by unanimous enactment of the Older Americans Act in 1965, are such that there should be an immediate reconsideration of these funding cuts.

I am especially disturbed by proposed reductions in activities directly involving older individuals. Important among these are the community programs—senior citizens centers, homemakers services, meals on wheels, and so forth—funded through State grants under title III of the Older Americans Act and the Foster Grandparents program.

I am also deeply disturbed, however, about the persistent downgrading of the Administration on Aging within the Department of Health, Education and Wel-

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fare. This process began almost immediately after the passage of the Older Americans Act of 1965 and has continued under both the Johnson and Nixon administrations.

Even before the Older Americans Act, action taken during the Kennedy administration suggested a bias within HEW against the needs of the elderly that has continued unabated ever since. Indeed, passage of the Older Americans Act of 1965 without a dissenting vote in either the House of Representatives or the Senate could, in itself, be interpreted as a congressional protest against current and previous discrimination against the elderly within HEW.

It may again be time for Congress to take a serious look at what appears to be a basic long-term departmental policy within HEW contrary to congressional intent. President Nixon's action in naming the Commissioner on Aging to a second post as Presidential Assistant on Aging strongly suggests that he, too, is personally concerned about the elderly and recognizes their need for a highly visible focal point within the executive branch of the Federal Government.

Proposed cuts in the Administration on Aging budget would seriously impair realization of this objective and work of the AOA. The total AOA budget does include some improvements. Among these, the increase of \$4,500,000 in funding for the recently authorized retired senior volunteers program, RSVP, is worthy of special commendation. It provides money for out-of-pocket expenses incurred by retirees doing voluntary community service. Its approval and implementation will do much to expand opportunities for involvement by older Americans in projects useful to themselves and others. There is also a proposal to increase funds for areawide projects by \$1,800,000.

This step forward with RSVP, however, and area-wide projects, does not justify the backward steps on existing, highly successful programs, particularly at the community level. The \$3,650,000 reduction in funds for community program grants under title III of the Older Americans Act and the \$3 million reduction for the Foster Grandparents program will work serious hardship in almost every State. Many persons and organizations in my own State of Vermont are seriously disturbed by this possibility. Also deserving review is the \$2,150,000 cut in funds proposed for research and training.

While the proposed reductions are a substantial percentage of the total Administration on Aging budget, it should be remembered that the savings they would involve would be almost insignificant in comparison to other Federal expenditures and would have little impact on the total Federal budget. Certainly the amount is small when related to the needs of over 20 million older Americans and all out of proportion to damage the cuts would do to the State Offices on Aging.

Serious as the immediate problem would be if the proposed reductions are allowed to stand, my work as a member of the Senate Special Committee on Aging since 1962 makes me wonder if

they are not a symptom of a far more serious problem within the Federal Government's executive branch regarding older persons.

I do not propose to give a complete review of the history of HEW's attitude. Certain facts on the record suffice to indicate the problem and its persistence.

In 1962, the very year after the White House Conference on Aging called by President Eisenhower had emphasized the importance of a strong focal point for needs of older persons in the Federal Government, the Office of Aging was downgraded and made a subsidiary part of the Welfare Administration in HEW. This action was probably a factor in heightened interest on the part of Congress in an independent unit on aging, an interest which ultimately produced the Older Americans Act of 1965.

Resistance from HEW continued. This is documented by repeated testimony between 1962 and 1965 by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare against proposals similar to that finally enacted. That the Congress did not share such reluctance to move on behalf of older persons is shown by its action in passing the Older Americans Act, which was signed into law by President Johnson, July 14, 1965.

In August 1967 a reorganization plan was announced placing the Administration on Aging under a new Social and Rehabilitation Service within HEW. So far this action, recommended by then Secretary of HEW Wilbur Cohen and regarded by many as violating Congressional intent, remains unchanged.

That this persistent pattern of submerging programs for the elderly has generated much dissatisfaction among older Americans is obvious. That it is contrary to the intent of Congress in its passage of the Older Americans Act of 1965 and subsequent amendments is clear.

It seems to me that corrective action, either by the administration or by the Congress, deserves serious consideration. A first step, but only a first step, will be early action on the proposed budget cuts for the Administration on Aging. The entire history of the Administration on Aging strongly suggests, however, that a thorough review of its relationship to other Federal agencies should be undertaken.

CEYLONESE INDEPENDENCE

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, on February 4, 1971, Ceylon commemorated the 23d anniversary of its independence. Ceylon has remained a stable democracy throughout the last two decades of our history and has carried on the finest democratic traditions in its election of government officials, and in the other functions of its government.

I should like to express my admiration for the people of Ceylon and my hopes that their example will serve as an inspiration to other countries of the world.

THE SEV AND THE ARCTIC

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, in a time when many persons have expressed concern about damage that could be

done to the tundra by surface vehicles, we should consider all alternatives. One method of transport which may hold the answer to the problem is the Surface Effect Vehicle—SEV—which rides on an air cushion. An article dealing with the SEV and its potential in the Arctic was published recently in "Rendezvous," the public relations department magazine of Bell Aerospace. The article, is based in part on a technical paper by A. W. Courtial, technical director for SEV development at Bell Aerospace.

I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Awesome, icebound and ruler of one of the Free World's last potentially great oil and mineral deposits, the Arctic region of Alaska and Canada lies waiting . . . majestically influencing world weather conditions and challenging man's every move along its frontiers.

Exploration to dare has surfaced the prospect of vast resources in Arctic Alaska and Canada. The southern slopes of Alaska's Brooks Range promise huge stores of metallic ores. Below the northern slopes are huge reservoirs of low-sulphur coals. Recent evidence of submerged gold is being pursued on the northern continental shelf in Norton Sound off the coast of Nome.

Although the Prudhoe Bay oil strikes are now history, additional millions are being invested each year in attempts to speed development of the oil-rich Alaskan North Slope. However, as it is with practically every other polar project, significant progress here has been limited to a large extent by the lack of an effective, flexible and economically feasible off-road transportation system.

Approval for the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System also has not yet been granted. The pipe for it remains stored at Valdez, Prudhoe Bay and strategic points to the north along the proposed pipeline route.

The mammoth tanker Manhattan, which attempted to establish the feasibility of year-around operations through the Northwest Passage, proved only that the transport of crude oil from the Arctic continental land mass by tanker would be economically unfeasible.

Scientific research in the Arctic Basin and surrounding land masses is still looking for a transportation system that will return more for the budget dollar.

Personnel and high-value cargo transportation in the Arctic today is primarily by air. Such air transports as the C130, DC-3, 727 and 737 are serving remote airstrips, many of which are makeshift, and accessible only during certain months of the year.

And, once on the ground, most air-lifted cargoes still face the ever-present deterrents to delivery of cargo from the landing strips to the final point of delivery.

For example, railroads are almost nonexistent. Roads are generally prohibitively expensive and normally useable only during winter months, therefore are few in number and most often local only. Rivers are shallow, winding, boulder-strewn and generally unnavigable by conventional craft. And, transportation by ship or barge where possible, is limited to the short summer when the Arctic ice is melted or penetrable. Helicopters are constrained by range, weather and restricted payload carrying capacities. Cargo transport by snowmobile or dog sled is slow, limited and economically impractical.

Then there's the vast, flat and barren Arctic tundra. Criss-crossed with thousands of frozen ditches, troughs and other obstacles in the sub-zero winter months, the tundra is interspersed with thousands of small lakes